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Can Proactive Fuel Economy Strategies Help Automakers Mitigate 
Fuel-Price Risks? 
Walter McManus, PhD 
Director, Automotive Analysis Division 
University of Michigan Transportation Research Institute 
ABSTRACT 
Detroit automakers have opposed mandated improvements in fuel economy since legislation 
was first proposed in the 1970’s. Their opposition is based, among other considerations, on 
the assumption that their customers value fuel economy only when fuel prices are high. This 
paper presents the findings of our on-going research that strongly refutes this assumption. 
Using data on sales, prices, and attributes of vehicles in 2005, we find that consumers are 
willing to pay, on average, $578 per MPG for higher fuel economy. At the price of gasoline 
prevailing in 2005, $2.30 per gallon, the $578 per MPG that consumers are willing to pay 
for fuel economy implies that consumers put more weight in choosing vehicles on future 
fuel savings than most analysts (including ourselves) had thought. 
 
The paper incorporates these new data-driven estimates of the value of fuel economy into an 
automotive market simulation model that has three components: a consumer demand 
function that predicts consumers’ vehicle choices as functions of vehicle price, fuel price, 
and vehicle attributes (the new estimates of the value of fuel economy are used to set the 
parameters of the demand function); an engineering and economic evaluation of feasible 
fuel economy improvements by 2010; and a game theoretic analysis of manufacturers’ 
competitive interactions. 
 
Using our model, we estimated the market shares and profits of automakers in 128 separate 
scenarios defined by alternative plausible values for the price of fuel and consumers’ 
discount rates. Under the fuel price risks and the competitive risks that automakers face, our 
analysis concludes that a proactive strategy of pursuing fuel economy improvements—
above and beyond what is required by law—would increase annual profits for Ford ($0.5 
billion to $1.4 billion), GM ($0.2 billion to $0.5 billion, and DaimlerChrysler ($0.1 billion). 
Even if the uncertainty over fuel price were removed, all three automakers would increase 
profits by pursuing fuel economy improvements, though the gains are smaller with fuel at 
$2.00/gallon. 
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Introduction 
Detroit automakers opposed mandatory improvements in fuel economy when legislation was 
first proposed in the early 1970’s, and continue to resist increases in the standards today. 
Their opposition appears to stem from an assumption that new-vehicle buyers value higher 
fuel economy only when fuel prices are extremely high. Automakers thus believe that higher 
fuel economy standards would diminish their profits, especially if fuel prices were much 
lower. Events of 2005 have made it clear that consumers are reacting to higher fuel prices by 
migrating to more fuel-efficient options; primarily to the detriment of Detroit automakers 
market share and profits. 
 
In this paper, we examine the economic viability of improving fuel economy as a strategy to 
mitigate the risk of high fuel prices and to gain competitive advantage in an automotive 
market in which customers demand, and are willing to pay for fuel efficiency. We adopt a 
“scenario analysis” approach where individual automaker fuel economy strategies are tested 
against various scenarios of fuel prices and other automaker fuel economy strategies. Our 
goal is to determine which strategies maximize variable profits and U.S. auto industry 
employment. 
 
The paper has five sections: 
 
High Fuel Prices Have Diminished Detroit Automakers’ Market Share and Profit. The 
first section reviews the current state of the auto industry, and in particular, how high fuel 
prices are a primary contributing factor to the rapid erosion of Detroit automaker’s market 
share, profits, and jobs. 
 
Technological Options.  In this section, we summarize what automakers can do to improve 
fuel economy by 2010. The details are given in an appendix. 
 
Market Model. This section explains the analytical model of the U.S. automotive market 
we use to describe the behavior of consumers and automakers in response to changes in fuel 
prices, competitive conditions, and consumer tastes. The model is used in the scenario 
analysis to predict overall market outcomes (sales, profits, jobs) as well as the sales, prices, 
variable profits, and attributes of the individual products sold in the market. 
 
Total sales of light vehicles (in units) are estimated in one sub-model as a function of 
income, demographics, and the average attributes of light vehicles. The market shares of 
individual vehicles are derived in a second sub-model that predicts the choices by consumers 
of specific vehicles as functions of the attributes both of these vehicles (including 
performance, size, and cost of ownership and operation) and of all other vehicles. The 
preferences and tastes of consumers are measured as estimates of consumers’ willingness to 
pay for attributes of vehicles. 
 
We compute sales in units, revenues, and pretax variable profit for each manufacturer, 
segment, and vehicle by multiplying total market sales (first sub-model) by vehicle shares 
(second sub-model) and aggregating the results. We then estimate the impact of changes in 
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the level and mix of sales and production of vehicles on U.S. employment by applying 
parameters from the REMI (Regional Economic Models, Inc.) model to our predicted sales. 
 
Scenario Analysis. In this section, we characterize the risks and uncertainties facing 
automakers, and explore the impacts of these risks and uncertainties on their choices of fuel 
economy strategies. An automaker faces two types of risk when choosing a fuel economy 
strategy. One type of risk comes from uncertainty about future fuel prices and consumer 
tastes. The other type of risk comes from uncertainty about the future actions of competitors. 
We incorporate both types of risk in 128 scenarios defined by different outcomes for fuel 
prices, consumer trade-offs, and fuel economy strategy choices of the automakers. 
 
In assessing the 128 outcomes from an automaker’s point of view, we focus on the 
automaker’s pretax variable profit under each scenario and assume automakers are 
motivated to maximize that profit. 
 
Results: Raising Fuel Economy Performance as a Key Strategy to Maximize Profits 
Findings are summarized and issues for further research are discussed in the final section. 
  5     
High Fuel Prices Have Diminished Detroit Automakers’ 
Market Share and Profit 
The relationship between fuel prices and automakers’ product mix and profits has a long 
history.  The events of 2005 reinforce the conclusion that rising fuel prices have a 
substantial impact on profitability.  The key issue here is that automakers that are highly 
leveraged in truck-based products (SUVs and pickups) are especially vulnerable to higher 
fuel prices since these products tend to be less fuel-efficient. When fuel prices were low in 
the 1990’s (1990-1999 average gasoline price: $1.50 per gallon in today’s money), being 
dependent on such vehicles for profits was not a liability.  It is a serious liability today. 
High Fuel Prices Have Reduced Profitability of SUVs and Pickups  
In 1975, when Congress passed and President Ford signed the “Energy Policy Conservation 
Act” into law, light-duty trucks (pickups, vans, and a few SUVs) were only about 20% of all 
light vehicles sold in America. The Act targeted a doubling of passenger car fuel economy 
(to 27.5 miles per gallon) by 1984, and instructed the Secretary of Transportation to set 
light-duty truck CAFE at the “maximum feasible level.” The light-duty truck CAFE 
standard has consistently been 5-8 MPG below that of cars.  
 
Falling fuel prices after 1984 made American automotive consumers less interested in fuel 
economy and more interested in size and power. However, by this time, automakers had 
downsized passenger cars (down 10% in wheelbase and 24% in curb weight) to meet CAFE, 
and were constrained in how much power and size they could add to cars. So they turned to 
trucks and smudged, if not erased, the personal-use/work-use distinction between cars and 
trucks by using truck platforms to build SUVs. Light-duty trucks were 55% of all light 
vehicles sold in the U.S. in 2005. At the same time, the growing demand for SUVs pushed  
the average truck price from 98.6% of the average car price in 1984 to 108.9% in 1999. 
 
Since January 1999, fuel prices have been rising, and automakers’ ability to maintain prices 
and profits of trucks has steadily declined. However, Detroit automakers are heavily 
committed to trucks, and switching production from trucks to cars is also costly.  Rather 
than accept lower unit sales of trucks, they accepted lower profits from trucks. Their 
dependence on trucks contributed to the automakers’ failure to react fast enough to the 
beginning of the end of the shift to light trucks.  
 
Ford GM DaimlerChrysler Nissan Toyota Honda Other Total
2004 62% 61% 44% 36% 28% 0% 16% 44%
2005 58% 57% 44% 39% 25% 0% 13% 41%
Source: Author's calculations based on Ward's Automotive Reports and estimates of pretax variable profits.
Ford includes Mazda; DaimlerChrysler includes Mitsubishi.
Estimated Share of Company's Total Pretax Profits from SUVs, Pickups, and Large Vans, 2004 and 2005
 
 
As a legacy of Detroit automakers’ shift to trucks in the 1980’s and 1990’s, they continue to 
earn a large portion of their profits from truck-based products (The table counts as “truck-
based” SUVs, pickups, and large vans, but not uni-body crossover vehicles, minivans, or 
Honda’s Ridgeline pickup). GM and Ford earned three-fifths of their total pretax variable 
profit from truck-based vehicles in 2004. As the market shifted away from trucks, GM and 
  6     
Ford lost variable profit in truck-based vehicles in 2005 and were not able to offset these 
losses with gains in car-based vehicles. 
 
DaimlerChrysler earned 44% of its profits from truck-based vehicles in 2004 and again in 
2005. The combination of Mercedes-Benz in the luxury market, and Chrysler group’s 
domination of the minivan market, make DaimlerChrysler less exposed to fuel price risks 
than Ford or GM. 
 
Nissan and Toyota have been behind Detroit in shifting to truck-based vehicles and Honda 
has stayed exclusively with car-based vehicles. Nissan sold 23% more truck-based vehicles 
in 2005 than it did in 2004, and boosted its truck-based variable profits from 36 to 39% of 
total profits as a result. Toyota’s sales and profits 2005 over 2004 growth was concentrated 
in car-based vehicles, so its truck-based variable profits fell from 28 to 25% of total profits. 
Financial Health of the Domestic Automakers Have Been Hurt by 
High Fuel Prices 
The poor financial health of GM and Ford can be attributed in large part to the effects of 
high fuel prices and their dependence on truck-based products. The Chrysler group’s 
minivans (which are more fuel-efficient than SUVs of a similar size) and luxury cars from 
Mercedes-Benz have somewhat insulated DaimlerChrysler from the effects of higher fuel 
prices. The Japan 3 are seeing share and profit growth, and are increasing their North 
American capacity as a result. GM, Ford, and DaimlerChrysler also have significant cost 
disadvantages compared to the Japan 3, much of which can be attributed to legacy issues 
(health care and pension costs). However, management decisions, such as focusing on truck-
based products, have also contributed to their situation. 
 
DaimlerChrysler Ford GM Honda Nissan Toyota
2004 $67.7 $87.4 $114.7 $33.0 $24.5 $52.7
2005 $69.5 $85.7 $113.3 $37.1 $28.1 $58.9
'05 O/U '04 2.6% -2.0% -1.3% 12.4% 14.5% 11.7%
DaimlerChrysler Ford GM Honda Nissan Toyota
2004 $15.5 $19.6 $25.7 $7.2 $5.5 $12.0
2005 $15.8 $19.2 $25.4 $8.2 $6.3 $13.4
'05 O/U '04 2.0% -2.3% -1.4% 13.5% 15.1% 11.4%
Estimated Retail Revenue (Billions)
Estimated Pretax Variable Profit (Billions)
 
Detroit Automakers’ Factories and Jobs at Risk 
GM and Ford in particular face the toughest challenges of their history. Both are losing 
money in North America and are closing plants and cutting jobs to bring their domestic 
production in line with their falling market shares. Ford plans to idle 14 facilities, including 
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seven assembly plants, and eliminate 25,000 to 30,000 jobs by 2012. GM plans to idle or 
reduce 15 facilities, including eight assembly plants, and eliminate 30,000 jobs by 2008. 
Ford will announce accelerated cuts to costs and jobs in mid-September 2006. 
 
GM appears to be working through its restructuring more rapidly than Ford. The results of 
GM’s early retirement and buyout program have been stronger than expected. All of GM’s 
113,000 U.S. hourly workers and 13,000 hourly workers at parts-maker Delphi were offered 
early retirement or buyout. More than 30,000 GM workers and 12,000 Delphi workers have 
accepted, allowing GM to eliminate 30,000 jobs two years earlier than planned -- by the end 
of 2006. GM has named all of the plants that it plans to close or reduce by 2008, but Ford 
has yet to name all of its targeted facilities. 
 
Last year we released a study (McManus, Baum, Hwang, Luria, and Barua [2005]) that 
identified a number of plants that were at risk of closure or reduction in the event of higher 
fuel prices. The study predicted that gasoline prices over $3.00/gallon could lead to 
combined losses of $7-$11 billion of profits for Detroit automakers. After the report’s 
release, gasoline prices rose 30-60% and spiked over $3.00/gallon. Ford and GM have so far 
reported over $19.3 billion in combined losses. In addition, they have lost 4.4 points of 
market share since 2004. 
  
When the report was released, it was criticized by Detroit automakers. They said our fuel 
price scenarios (We had two: $2.86 and $3.37) were implausible. GM told the Wall Street 
Journal that our estimates of variable profit per vehicle were low (WSJ, 5/13/05). In fact, it 
was our estimates of the impact of gasoline above $3.00/gallon that were low—the actual 
impacts on share and profits exceeded our predictions. 
 
Given that the vulnerability of GM and Ford to high fuel prices has been exposed, the 
question becomes: How are they addressing this vulnerability in their restructuring plans?  
The answer, in terms of announced closures or reductions in plants and products, is that they 
are not moving fast enough.  Our 2005 study identified as vulnerable the plants that were 
producing large SUVs and pickup trucks.  Events of the past year confirmed that 
vulnerability, as sales of these vehicles fell. 
 
In our 2005 study, we described signs of weakness and fuel-price vulnerability in large 
SUVs and pickup trucks in the form of the ever-higher incentives needed to maintain sales 
in units beginning in 2001.  Detroit automakers apparently ignored these early-warning signs 
or thought they had more time to adjust to the rapid shift away from gas-guzzling large 
SUVs and pickup trucks.  Clearly, their restructuring plans did not adequately prepare them 
for the precipitous decline in large SUV sales.  Instead, they have been forced to begin 
eliminating or reducing jobs and closing plants, including some that make relatively more 
fuel-efficient cars. We described signs of weakness and fuel-price vulnerability in large 
SUVs and pickup trucks in the form of the ever-higher incentives needed to maintain sales 
in units beginning in 2001. Events of the past year confirmed that vulnerability, as sales and 
prices of these vehicles fell. 
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The table below compares our list of vulnerable plants from the 2005 study to the announced 
plans of GM and Ford.  Both announced plans for plant reductions. Both Ford and GM are 
reducing their capacity in car models that have had high and growing sales into low profit 
daily rental fleets. They are both also reducing their capacity in midsize SUVs.  However, 
both companies committed more than four years ago to major redesigns of their large SUVs, 
and they are holding onto capacity to produce these larger, less fuel-efficient vehicles. The 
next section of this report looks at some actions the automakers could take to address their 
vulnerability more effectively. 
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Auto-
maker Plant Products 
2005 
UMTRI 
Study 
GM 11/05 
Ford 3/06 
Other 
actions 
GM Arlington, TX 
Large SUV 
(Escalade, 
Suburban, Tahoe, 
Tukon) 
ceased 
or 
reduced 
 
potential for 
reduced 
demand 
after initial 
launch 
GM Janesville, WI 
Large SUV 
(Suburban, Tahoe, 
Yukon) 
ceased 
or 
reduced 
 
potential for 
reduced 
demand 
after initial 
launch 
GM Moraine, OH 
Midsize SUV 
(Bravada, Envoy, 
Rainier, 
Trailblazer) 
ceased 
or 
reduced 
reduced 
2006  
GM Oklahoma City, OK 
Midsize SUV 
(TrailBlazer, 
Envoy) 
ceased 
or 
reduced 
ceased 
early 2006  
Ford St. Louis, MO 
Midsize SUV 
(Explorer, 
Mountaineer) 
ceased 
or 
reduced 
ceased  
Ford 
Wayne, MI 
(Michigan 
Truck) 
Large SUV 
(Expedition, 
Navigator) 
ceased 
or 
reduced 
 
reduced 
due to 
lower 
demand 
Ford 
St. 
Thomas, 
Ontario, 
Canada 
Large Car 
ceased 
or 
reduced 
 
will benefit 
from Wixom 
closure 
Ford Wixom, MI Large and Specialty Car 
ceased 
or 
reduced 
ceased 
2007  
Daimler-
Chrysler 
Newark, 
DE 
Midsize SUV 
(Durango) 
ceased 
or 
reduced 
 
reduced 
due to 
lower 
demand 
GM Toledo, OH RWD Transmission reduced  
reduced 
due to 
lower 
demand 
GM 
Ypsilanti, 
MI (Willow 
Run) 
RWD Transmission reduced   
  10     
 
Auto-
maker 
 
Plant 
 
Products 
2005 
UMTRI 
Study 
 
GM 11/05 
Ford 3/06 
 
Other 
actions 
 
 
GM 
 
 
Romulus, 
MI 
 
 
V8 Engine 
 
 
reduced 
 potential for 
reduced 
demand 
after initial 
launch 
 
Ford 
Sharonville, 
OH 
RWD 
Transmission 
 
reduced 
  
Ford Essex, 
Ontario, 
Canada 
 
V8 Engine 
 
reduced 
 reduced 
due to lower 
demand 
Daimler-
Chrysler 
 
Kokomo, IN 
 
RWD 
Transmission 
 
reduced 
 reduced 
due to lower 
demand 
 
Daimler-
Chrysler 
Detroit, MI 
(Mack 
Avenue) 
 
V8 Engine 
 
reduced 
 reduced 
due to lower 
demand 
 
Ford 
 
Atlanta, GA 
Midsize Car 
(Taurus, 
Sable) 
  
ceased 
 
Ford St. Paul, 
MN 
Small Pickup 
(Ranger) 
  
ceased 
 
 
Ford 
 
Norfolk, VA 
Large Pickup 
(F-150) 
  
ceased 
 
 
GM 
Lansing, MI 
Craft Center 
Chevrolet 
SSR 
 ceased mid 
2006 
 
 
GM 
Spring Hill, 
TN 
 
Compact Car 
 reduced 
late 2006 
 
 
GM 
Oshawa, 
Ont. Plant 1 
 
Midsize Car 
 reduced 
2006 
 
 
GM 
Oshawa, 
Ont. Plant 2 
 
Midsize Car 
 ceased 
2008 
Could be 
reopened 
later with 
new 
platform 
GM Doraville, 
GA 
Minivan  ceased 
2008 
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Automaker Plant Products 2005 
UMTRI 
Study 
GM 11/05 
Ford 3/06 
Other 
actions 
 
GM 
 
Flint V6 
engine 
 
V8 Engine 
  
ceased 
2008 
closed due 
to ripple 
effect from 
assembly 
plant 
closings 
 
GM 
 
Ste. 
Catherines 
Powertrain 
 
Powertrain 
parts 
  
ceased 
2008 
closed due 
to ripple 
effect from 
assembly 
plant 
closings 
GM Pittsburgh 
Stamping 
Stampings  ceased 
2007 
closed due 
to ripple 
effect from 
assembly 
plant 
closings 
GM Lansing 
Stamping 
Stampings  ceased 
2006 
closed due 
to ripple 
effect from 
assembly 
plant 
closings 
 
Ford 
 
Batavia 
Transmission 
 
Transmissions 
  
ceased 
closed due 
to ripple 
effect from 
assembly 
plant 
closings 
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Technological Options and Strategy Choices 
As part of this study, we assessed the ability for manufacturers to incorporate new and 
existing technologies by 2010 to improve the fuel economy performance of their overall 
fleet without changing their product portfolios. This section summarizes our assessment, 
with a more detailed discussion in the appendix. The appendix was written by Feng An, 
Roland Hwang, Walter McManus, and Alan Baum. 
 
We adopted two means to improve fuel economy. The first, which applies only to new 
powertrains, is based on a detailed powertrain-by-powertrain engineering assessment and a 
detailed forecast of product plans for calendar year 2010. Our assessment differs from 
previous studies (e.g., DeCicco et al. [2001] and NAS [2002]) in that we used a detailed 
forecast of products and powertrains for each manufacturer for 2010 to estimate near-term 
fleet-wide potential. The second, which applies to “carry-over” powertrains (introduced 
before 2005), is based on redirecting extrapolated historical rates of technology 
improvement. 
 
By combining an engineering assessment of what fuel economy technologies are available 
with a detailed forecast of each manufacturer’s production plans (including the timing when 
individual models would have an opportunity to integrate new technology), we can develop 
a realistic assessment of the technical potential to raise fuel economy. We also incorporate a 
decision-making rule to determine what level of technology to apply based on the 
incremental costs of alternative fuel-economy-improvement packages and consumers’ 
willingness to pay. In this way, we ensure that the package makes financial sense. 
 
To assess the opportunity for technology improvement, we divide vehicles into two 
categories. The first category consists of those vehicles that are scheduled for a new engine 
or new platform in model years 2007 to 2010. These vehicles have modern engines that have 
the opportunity for substantial improvement. The second category consists of those vehicles 
that are not scheduled for new engines between now and 2010. While these engines have 
less opportunity for improvement, there are nonetheless incremental opportunities for 
improvement -- through refinements of existing technology, recalibration of engines, and by 
directing the technologies likely to be adopted toward fuel economy improvements (rather 
than towards increasing power.) 
 
For the first category, we assume that any eligible vehicle model can be improved to the fuel 
economy level estimated by the National Academy of Science’s recent fuel economy study 
(NAS 2002) for that class segment.  We evaluated two packages of fuel-saving technologies.  
The two packages are the “Cost-efficient, 14-year”, and the “Path 2”.  All of the Path 2 
technologies currently exist, but not across the entire fleet.  The “Cost-efficient, 14-year” 
package includes Path 1 (technologies which are likely to be adopted) and a subset of Path 2 
technologies -- those that the NS study defines as “Cost-efficient” or pays for itself over 14 
years (at $1.50/gallon and 12% discount rate) on the margin.  More details on the package 
and our methodology can be found in the appendix. 
 
For carry-over engines not scheduled for replacement between 2007 and 2010, the “Cost-
efficient” and Path 2 packages are not available.  Instead, we applied improvements that rely 
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on planned technologies to increase specific power (horsepower per liter) and apply them to 
enhancing fuel economy.  The tradeoff is at the expense of increasing the specific power 
(horsepower per liter) of the engine.  A recent study shows that just using planned 
technologies, the light truck fleet could be improved by 2.8% per year (EEA 2005).  Honda 
has announced a 5% improvement (although this is probably a combination of new engines 
and improvements to existing engines.)  To illustrate the opportunity for an automaker to 
rapidly improve fuel economy even without new technologies, Ford recently announced its 
MY2007 Focus would achieve 3 MPG higher on the highway and 1 MPG higher on the city 
cycle (a 9% and 4% improvement respectively) simply through powertrain recalibration 
(Hoffman, “Big Plans for Tiny Focus,” Detroit News, 8/2/06). 
 
For the scenario analysis conducted by this study, we defined two choices of fuel economy 
strategies for automakers. To incorporate the technology options and to explore the impacts 
of following very different strategies, we assumed that each automaker could choose 
between: 
 
• Business As Usual (BAU): An automaker following the BAU strategy would make only 
those fuel economy improvements that are necessary to meet the CAFE requirements in 
2010. 
• Proactive (PROA): An automaker following the Proactive (PROA) strategy would make 
all the improvements identified in our technology assessment, provided they make 
financial sense to consumers. 
 
The table below shows the number of vehicle configurations that would be eligible for fuel 
economy improvements for each automaker, according to our technology assessment that 
would make financial sense to consumers. Since the value to consumers of the 
improvements depends on the price of fuel and the discount rate consumers use to value 
future fuel savings, the number of vehicle configurations eligible for improvements also 
depends on these two variables. The table shows if the price of fuel and the consumers’ 
discount rate were known with certainty, then automakers would choose to improve more 
vehicle configurations if the fuel price were higher or if the consumers’ discount rate were   
lower. 
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Vehicle Configurations Eligible for Fuel Economy Improvements 
by 2010 
       
   
Fuel Price 
$3.10/gallon 
Fuel Price 
$2.00/gallon 
 Automaker Total Powertrain Powertrain 
    New 
Carry-
Over New 
Carry-
Over 
 DCX 242 28 24 28 1 
 Ford 215 31 79 30 63 
Consumer GM 251 44 130 42 73 
Discount Honda 49 1 0 1 0 
Rate Nissan 62 3 32 3 10 
0% Toyota 67 7 4 8 2 
 Others 259 8 12 7 0 
 All 1,145 122 281 119 149 
       
       
 Automaker Total Powertrain Powertrain 
    New 
Carry-
Over New 
Carry-
Over 
 DCX 242 28 1 28 0 
 Ford 215 30 54 28 27 
Consumer GM 251 40 72 38 5 
Discount Honda 49 1 0 1 0 
Rate Nissan 62 3 9 2 0 
7% Toyota 67 7 0 8 2 
 Others 259 8 2 6 0 
 All 1,145 117 138 111 34 
 
 
 
However, neither the fuel price in 2010 not the discount rate consumers would use in 2010 
to value future fuel savings are known with certainty today, when automakers must decide 
which vehicle configurations to improve. In order to define one consistent set of vehicle 
configurations that would be improved under the PROA strategy, we developed probability-
weighted forecasts of fuel price and discount rate. 
 
For the discount rate we use the average of 0% and 7%: 3.5%. Given that the average price 
of fuel in 2006 is likely to be higher than it was in 2005 ($2.60/gallon versus $2.30/gallon), 
an assumption of equal probabilities for $2.00/gallon and $3.10/gallon is not as acceptable 
as it is for the discount rates. We thus assigned a somewhat higher probability (.545) for 
$3.10/gallon than for $2.00/gallon (.455), yielding the probability-weighted predicted price 
in 2010 of $2.60/gallon. 
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The table below gives the number of vehicle configurations of each automaker that define 
the PROA strategy. The percent of base sales represented by these vehicle configurations is 
also shown. 
 
Vehicle Configurations Eligible for Fuel Economy Improvements by 2010 
            
          New Powertrain Carry-Over Powertrain 
  Total         
Automaker   Percent of  Percent of 
   Number Automaker's Number Automaker's 
   Base Sales  Base Sales 
DaimlerChrysler 242 28 23.1% 1 2.0% 
Ford 215 30 32.3% 64 34.8% 
GM 251 44 17.5% 73 30.7% 
Honda 49 1 2.0% 0 0.0% 
Nissan 62 3 3.5% 10 13.5% 
Toyota 67 7 7.5% 0 0.0% 
Others 259 8 8.3% 2 3.2% 
All 1,145 121 16.9% 150 15.9% 
      
Fuel price $2.60/gal; discount rate 3.5%   
Changes due to sales mix not included    
 
 
Ford has the most potential to improve fuel economy by either means. By 2010, Ford could 
improve new powertrains that account for 32.3% of its base sales, and could also improve 
carry-over powertrains that account for another 34.8% of its base sells. DaimlerChrysler and 
GM could improve new powertrains representing significant shares of its sales. GM could 
improve carry-over powertrains representing significant shares of its sales. The larger 
Japanese automakers, which have significantly more fuel-efficient fleets than do Detroit 
automakers, have few improvements that would pay for consumers. The implications for 
measured MPG by manufacturer are shown in the table below. 
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DaimlerChrysler 23.60 1.41
Ford 23.71 2.91
GM 23.58 1.47
Honda 27.44 0.18
Nissan 26.23 0.34
Toyota 27.10 1.11
Others 26.88 0.92
All 24.82 1.49
Fuel price $2.60/gal; discount rate 3.5%
Changes due to sales mix not included
Automaker
Base Average 
MPG
Increase in 
MPG at Base 
Sales Mix
Increases in MPG by Automaker
 
 
If Ford were to adopt the PROA strategy, then it could increase its baseline fuel economy by 
2.91 MPG (a 12% improvement). This potential increase is computed at our baseline sales 
forecast for Ford’s vehicles and does not include the impact of changes in sales mix. By 
adopting the PROA strategy, GM could increase its baseline fuel economy by 1.47 miles per 
gallon (6%), and DaimlerChrysler could increase its baseline fuel economy by 1.41 miles 
per gallon (6 percent). Other automakers have much less potential to increase fuel economy 
consistent with the willingness of Americans to pay for the fuel-saving technologies. Make 
no mistake, the opportunity that the Detroit automakers have to profitably increase the fuel 
economy of their fleets by 7-17%, is largely due to the current lower than average fuel 
economy level of their fleet. Honda, Toyota, and Nissan have fleets with better fuel 
economy today and in our baseline; and they would continue to have fleets with better fuel 
economy than GM, Ford, and DaimlerChrysler even if all automakers made the 
improvements proposed here. For Detroit, the PROA strategy would narrow, but not 
eliminate, their disadvantage in fuel economy relative to Honda, Toyota, and Nissan.  
 
At our baseline sales forecast in 2010, we estimate a 6% increase in overall fuel economy 
from the baseline 2010 fuel economy or 7.4% increase over model year 2005 estimated fuel 
economy of 24.5 mpg (EPA 2005). The 7.4% increase over today’s level is consistent with 
the 4% to 8.2% range we derived from a review of other studies (see Appendix) and equates 
to a modest 1.5% annual increase between 2006 and 2010. 
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Market Model 
The market model used in this study was an extension and enhancement of that used in 
McManus et al. (2005). Our model of the automotive market consists of two sub-models. 
The first sub-model computes total industry sales of all vehicles, and the second sub-model 
computes the market share of individual vehicles. The two sub-models simultaneously 
determine the unit sales and attributes of all vehicles, which can then be aggregated by 
segment or manufacturer. 
 
1. Total Industry Sales (first sub-model) Our base sales for 2010 are from the forecast 
by The Planning Edge. The Planning Edge forecast incorporates the effects of 
demographics, economics, and competitive product plans. Starting from base sales, 
we assess the market impact of different fuel prices and manufacturer fuel economy 
strategies on vehicle sales. 
2. Market Shares by Vehicle Configuration (second sub-model) The UMTRI 
Automotive Consumer Choice model is used to estimate the effects of gasoline 
prices, consumer tastes, and the competitive behavior of automakers on sales, prices, 
and variable profit for each of the 1,145 manufacturer, model, engine, transmission, 
drive, and body style configurations. We aggregate the 1,145 configurations by 
segment, manufacturer, and other dimensions for analysis. Econometrically, the 
UMTRI Automotive Consumer Choice model is a nested multinomial logit (NMNL) 
that describes the mapping of consumers’ preferences for attributes of vehicles 
(power, size, fuel economy) into consumers’ preferences for vehicles. In this study, 
we expanded the NMNL used in McManus et al. 2005.  
 
To estimate the impact of lower sales and production levels on employment for the United 
States and for three highly auto-intensive states (Michigan, Ohio, and Indiana), we use a 
well-known regional economic model (REMI). 
Change in Total Industry Sales, Example Calculation 
The UMTRI Automotive Consumer Choice model predicts changes in shares of sales, so we 
modeled the impact of scenarios and actions of automakers and consumers on total industry 
sales in a separate sub-model and fed the result into the UMTRI Automotive Consumer 
Choice sub-model. 
 
Changes from base total industry sales are determined in the sub-model by the average 
values of vehicle attributes and estimates of the effects of these attributes on industry-level 
sales. We measure the effects of attributes on sales through elasticities, which give the 
percentage change in sales resulting from a 1% change in the attributes. The table below is 
an example of how the average attributes at our base case, the change in these average 
attributes weighted by base sales units, and our estimated elasticities used to estimate the 
impact on total industry sales. The impact of each attribute’s change is calculated and these 
separate changes are summed across attributes to compute the total impact. 
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Base Value 
of Attribute
New Value 
of Attribute
Average 
Weighted by 
Base Sales
Average 
Weighted by 
Base Sales
Performance 
(horsepower 
per ton)
115 115 0.0% 0.03 0.0%
Curb weight 
(lb)
3930 3930 0.0% 0.03 0.0%
Footprint       
(sq ft)
49.4 49.4 0.0% 0.03 0.0%
Fuel Cost  
(cents per 
mile)
9.3 12.5 34.8% (0.10) (3.5%)
Price $26,740 $26,740 0.0% (0.75) 0.0%
Sales (3.5%)
Base New
Percent 
Change
Implied 
Elasticity
Fuel Price 
(cents per 
gallon)
230 310 34.8% (0.10)
Total Industry Sales 
Percent 
Change in 
Attribute
Percent 
Change in 
Sales
Impact of 
Attribute 
Change on 
Sales 
(Elasticity)
Memo: Implied Fuel-Price Elasticity of Sales
Attribute
 
 
In the UMTRI Automotive Consumer Choice model, the top-level price elasticity is -1.0, but 
to be conservative we computed the impact on total sales of fuel price and attribute changes 
with a smaller elasticity, -0.75. The appropriate elasticity for direct price changes (such as a 
cash rebate) is -1.0, but when the change is indirect (through willingness-to-pay), the impact 
could be smaller. 
The UMTRI Automotive Consumer Choice Model 
Discrete choice models are ideally suited to markets with many individual product 
configurations. These models match the intuitive notion that a vehicle is a bundle of 
attributes and that its value to a consumer is derived from the value the consumer places on 
the attributes. The demand for vehicles is seen as a derived demand arising from the demand 
for vehicle attributes. 
 
This study enhances the model in McManus et al. (2005), which defined vehicles by only 
two attributes: price and fuel economy. This was an appropriate restriction for that study, 
since its aim was simply to estimate the sales and profit losses resulting from higher fuel 
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prices. The potential losses we predicted in that study would be massive for Detroit and 
would likely stimulate investment in fuel-saving technologies. 
 
This study’s aim is to assess the potential for Detroit automakers to improve fuel economy 
by 2010. We expand the list of attributes to include measures of vehicle performance and 
size. McManus et al. (2005) derived a key parameter, consumers’ willingness-to-pay for fuel 
economy, from assumptions about the useful life of the typical vehicle, the number of miles 
driven annually, and consumers’ rate-of-time preference. While the practice of using such 
assumptions in this context is common, small variations in assumptions produce an 
uncomfortably wide range of estimates and conclusions. In this study, we used a procedure 
(explained below) that narrows this range. 
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The nested consumer choice tree we used in this study, shown in the figure above, is 
identical to that used in McManus et al., 2005. Consumers choose among all the 1,145 
vehicle configurations available in the U.S. market. The nested tree is a convenient tool for 
interpreting the model, but should not be taken to imply that consumers choose sequentially. 
We groups similar vehicles together in the nested structure since they are likely to exhibit 
similar responses to events and market changes. The highest level captures interactions 
between six vehicle types: CAR, CUV (crossover utility vehicle), MINIVAN, PU (pickup 
truck), SUV (sport utility vehicle), and VN (large van). The next level down captures the 
interactions between vehicle segments within CAR, CUV, PU, and SUV. (MINIVAN and 
VN are not partitioned into segments, so this step is skipped.) At the third and lowest level 
we capture the interactions between vehicle configurations within product segments. 
Vehicle’s Value Comes from Its Attributes 
We assume that the value to consumers of a vehicle is derived from the value to consumers 
of the vehicle’s attributes. If I (as a consumer) value fuel economy and would be willing to 
pay $500 to increase the fuel economy by 1.0 MPG when gasoline costs $2.30/gallon, then, 
according to our assumption, I would be willing to pay $500 more for a vehicle that offers 
1.0 MPG more than another vehicle that is identical in all other respects. I would also be 
willing to pay more than $500 for the additional MPG if the price of fuel were unexpectedly 
higher than $2.30. 
 
By treating the value of the vehicle as a bundle of values of attributes, we can predict the 
impact on demand for vehicles caused by changes in external conditions (e.g., price of fuel) 
that affect the values of attributes (e.g., MPG). To put this more rigorously in terms of 
economic theory, our assumption is that the utility that the ith consumer derives from the jth 
vehicle is given by equation 1. 
(1) 
! 
uij = aj +b pricej +w1performancej +w2sizej +w3
pg
mpg j
" 
# 
$ $ 
% 
& 
' '  
The known quantities in equation 1 are the vehicle attributes of price, performance, size, and 
MPG; and the price of gasoline. The parameters of the utility function that need to be 
estimated are aj (an intercept that varies by vehicle); b (the slope of utility with respect to 
vehicle price); and the three w parameters (consumers’ willingness to pay for increments of 
the associated attributes.) Note that the price of gasoline (in cents per gallon) divided by 
MPG is the vehicle’s fuel cost per mile driven (in cents per mile), so the parameter w3 
measures willingness to pay for a one-cent reduction in fuel cost per mile. 
 
Another way to think about of w3 is as the “discounted present value” of lifetime vehicle 
miles. The value of one-cent per mile (w3) times lifetime vehicle miles would yield the total 
value—if vehicle miles did not change over time and if consumers valued saving one cent 
per mile in future years the same as they value saving one-cent per mile this year. 
 
Each of the 1,145 vehicle configurations offered for sale is unique, and most consumers buy 
only one vehicle at a time. Models of demand that assume a continuously variable product 
would be inappropriate. Instead, we model the demand for a specific vehicle as the 
probability that the ith consumer chooses the jth vehicle, as in equation 2. 
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(2) 
! 
pij =
e
uij
e
uik
k" j
#  
Estimates of Parameters 
The UMTRI Automotive Consumer Choice model is a nested multinomial logit (NMNL). 
(McFadden [1973] originated the NMNL. See Train [2003] for a comprehensive description 
of NMNL and related models.) Researchers have recently begun to apply NMNL models to 
automotive questions. 
 
One strand of research has concentrated on improving the accuracy of the NMNL model 
with innovations in statistics and data. Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (2004) explored the role 
of detailed consumer attribute data, together with data on the second choices of consumers 
(given to them by GM) in estimating a demand system for passenger vehicles. They found 
GM’s second-choice data to be helpful, but concluded that to pin down the absolute level of 
elasticities, some outside information must be used. (More about GM’s data below.) 
 
Feng, Fullerton, and Gan, (2004) used ownership rather that purchase as the dependent 
variable and extended the NMNL by incorporating choices about miles traveled. They found 
that pollution reduction policies influence both the mix of vehicles a household wants and 
the number of miles traveled. Bento, Goulder, Henry, Jacobsen, and Von Haefen (2005) also 
used the NMNL model with ownership rather than purchases as the dependent variable to 
examine the distributional effects of a gasoline tax. They concluded that whether the tax is 
regressive or not depends on how tax proceeds are “recycled” to consumers. 
 
Train and Winston (2006) used the NMNL model to examine the causes of the loss in 
market share for U.S. automakers, and concluded that nearly all of the loss in market share 
could be explained by changes in the basic attributes of vehicles: price, size, power, 
operating cost, and body style. These are the variables we use in our model. 
 
A second strand of research has concentrated on applying the NMNL models to inform 
policy decisions, using the NMNL form and deriving parameter estimates from outside the 
model. Our model is in this strand of research. Greene, Duleep, and McManus (2004) used 
the NMNL model with external parameter estimates to examine the future potential of 
hybrid and clean diesel powertrains. McManus (2005) used a simplified NMNL model with 
external parameter estimates to predict the impact on sales, profits, and employment of high 
fuel prices, assuming automakers follow a “Business as Usual” (BAU) strategy on fuel 
economy.  Santini and Vyas (2005) applied the NMNL model with external parameter 
estimates to simulating advanced vehicles introduction decisions. 
 
One external (external to an NMNL model) source of parameter estimates that has been 
somewhat overlooked is hedonic regression, a method developed by Griliches (1961) and 
used today by the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) to adjust the Consumer Price Index 
(CPI) for quality changes (See Johnson, Reed, and Stewart [2006] for documentation of the 
expansion of hedonic regression models at the BLS). 
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A hedonic regression would estimate the relationship between vehicle price (as the 
dependent variable) and various attributes of the vehicle (as the independent variables). The 
regression coefficients measure the implicit “price” of the attributes. Espey and Nair (2005) 
estimated a hedonic regression with 2002 data on Manufacturer’s Suggested Retail Price 
(MSRP) and vehicle attributes. (Also see Espey’s commentary on policy implications in 
Regulation (Cato Institute), Winter 2005-2006). 
 
 
 
We estimated a hedonic regression using actual transaction prices instead of MSRP as the 
dependent variable -- with performance, size, and fuel economy as the independent 
variables. The figure above summarizes our results for the value of fuel economy and shows 
how we used the hedonic estimate of the value of fuel economy to calibrate the discount rate 
in our model. 
 
From the hedonic regression, we estimate that the average value of one MPG was $578 in 
2005. Espey and Nair (2005) estimated a similar value ($613) in 2002. To calibrate the 
discount rate, we constructed the present value curve in the figure, which shows the value of 
improving fuel economy by one MPG as a function of the discount rate, given the fuel price 
in 2005 ($2.30/gallon). The discount rate at which consumers implicitly discount future fuel 
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savings is that rate that equates the present value calculation and the hedonic value—
(0.35%)—the discount rate at which the two lines intersect. 
 
Assuming (along with Espey and Nair [2005] and CBO [2003]) a 14-year useful life for the 
average vehicle and assuming annual miles decline at 5.2% per year of vehicle age, the 
discount rate implied by the analysis is negative, (0.35%). The discount rate can be thought 
of as the real market rate of interest minus the expected rate of inflation in fuel prices (over 
and above general price inflation). The real market rate of interest is on the order of 7%, so a 
negative discount rate implies that consumers expect inflation in fuel prices to be faster than 
7Espey and Nair (2005) also found very low or negative discount rates, and suggested that 
consumers value reductions in greenhouse gases and other emissions. This is a plausible 
interpretation, but we believe expected inflation in fuel prices is a more likely cause of 
negative discount rates. To be conservative, we used 0% as the lower bound on the discount 
rate in our scenarios, even though negative discount rates are plausible. This is much lower 
than rates used in other studies. CBO (2003) and McManus et al. (2005) used 14%. Santini 
and Vyas (2005) used 10%. Greene, Duleep, and McManus (2004) used 0.0%, but assumed 
that new vehicle buyers value only about the first three years of cost savings. 
 
Choosing the discount rate to use in our analysis is more than a mere technicality. The 
discount rate summarizes an assumption about the value consumers place on future benefits 
and costs and their expectations of future fuel prices. Consumer demand for automobiles is 
derived from the value consumers put on current and future services (transportation, fashion) 
offset by current and future costs. The higher the discount rate, the less value put on future 
services and costs relative to current services and costs. 
 
The table below summarizes this section by giving our estimates of demand elasticities for 
price, performance, size, and fuel cost per mile. The elasticity of demand for fuel cost per 
mile is shown at the two alternative discount rates. 
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Price Performance Size
Fuel Cost per 
Mile (Discount 
Rate 0%)
Fuel Cost per 
Mile (Discount 
Rate 7%)
Car-Luxury (1.90) 0.67 0.50 (0.23) (0.16)
Car-Midsize (2.00) 1.29 0.96 (0.46) (0.31)
Car-Small (2.30) 1.41 1.31 (0.51) (0.34)
CUV-Luxury (1.90) 0.65 0.58 (0.33) (0.22)
CUV-Midsize (2.00) 1.00 0.84 (0.47) (0.31)
CUV-Small (2.30) 1.37 1.25 (0.59) (0.40)
Minivan (2.00) 0.98 0.97 (0.56) (0.38)
Pickup-Large (1.40) 0.79 0.75 (0.39) (0.26)
Pickup-Small (2.00) 1.36 1.14 (0.62) (0.42)
SUV-Large Luxury (1.90) 0.49 0.42 (0.27) (0.18)
SUV-Large (2.00) 0.83 0.73 (0.51) (0.34)
SUV-Midsize (2.10) 1.12 0.85 (0.58) (0.39)
SUV-Midsize Luxury (1.90) 0.43 0.47 (0.28) (0.18)
SUV-Small (2.30) 1.86 1.00 (0.49) (0.33)
Van-Large (1.50) 0.89 0.98 (0.50) (0.34)
Car (2.00) 1.07 0.84 (0.38) (0.26)
Crossover Utility Vehicle (1.90) 0.93 0.81 (0.43) (0.29)
Minivan (2.00) 0.98 0.97 (0.56) (0.38)
Pickup (1.40) 0.82 0.76 (0.39) (0.26)
Sport Utility Vehicle (1.90) 0.81 0.66 (0.44) (0.30)
Van (1.50) 0.89 0.98 (0.50) (0.34)
Total Vehicles (1.00) 0.51 0.44 (0.23) (0.15)
Elasticity = the percentage change in demand for a 1 percent change in the attribute.
UMTRI Automotive Consumer Choice Model:                          
Demand Elasticities
 
Comparing Price-Elasticities 
The price elasticities we use in this study were derived from McManus et al. (2005).  GM 
maintains a set of price elasticities between segments that are based on new-vehicle buyers’ 
second choice—the vehicle they would have bought had the vehicle they actually bought not 
been available. The studies by Kleit [2004] and Parry et al. [2004] used elasticities provided 
by GM. (The Kleit [2004] article is a published version of a study done for GM.) Berry, 
Levinsohn, and Pakes [2004)], as discussed in an earlier section of this report, were given 
the raw data on the second-choices of consumers. They found GM’s second-choice data to 
be helpful, but concluded that to pin down the absolute level of elasticities, some outside 
information must be used.  
 
Our elasticities are more conservative than GM’s in all but two product segments—luxury 
car and large SUV.  In these two segments, the differences do not appear to influence our 
results. We do not classify vehicles into the same segments that GM does. We compared our 
  26     
luxury car segment to GM’s large car segment, and we had to aggregate a few of our SUV 
and CUV segments to match GM’s large SUV segment. The large car segment is very small 
so the difference is not important to our results. GM’s large SUV segment elasticity is -1.88 
while our equivalent segment elasticity is -2.00, a difference too small to affect our results. 
Overall, our elasticities are more conservative than GM’s, and if we were to calibrate 
exactly to GM’s, the impacts described later in this paper would be larger. 
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Scenario Analysis 
In this section, we describe the scenario analysis we conducted for this study. The purposes 
of the scenario analysis are to understand the risks that automakers face in deciding what 
fuel economy strategy to follow, to understand how the various risks influence automakers’ 
decisions, and to suggest the decisions that automakers are likely to make and the associated 
market outcomes. To accomplish these purposes, we need to define automakers’ goals and 
to estimate the impact on these goals of changes in important but uncertain variables (e.g., 
fuel price). We rely on a model of competitive behavior called “game theory” to predict the 
likely decisions by automakers. If it turns out that automakers do not appear to be acting as 
predicted by game theory, then the theory can help identify the sources of the disparity and 
suggest alternative public policies to achieve desired results. 
 
We defined four market-demand scenarios based on two alternative fuel prices and two 
alternative consumer discount rates. The diagram below shows the four alternative market 
demand scenarios. We expect the market demand for fuel economy (and the gains to 
automakers from improving the fuel economy of their vehicles) to be greatest in the scenario 
with a fuel price of $3.10/gallon and a consumer discount rate of 0% (Market Demand I) and 
lowest in the scenario with a fuel price of $2.20/gallon and a consumer discount rate of 7% 
(Market Demand IV).  
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On top of these four market-demand scenarios we defined additional scenarios based on 
strategic choices by five automakers (DaimlerChrysler, Ford, GM, Japan 3, and others) to 
define a total of 128 scenarios. We aggregated the three largest Japan-based automakers into 
one “aggregate automaker” and all other automakers into another “aggregate automaker.” 
As described in the section on technological options, we defined two alternative fuel 
economy strategies “Business as Usual” (BAU) and “Proactive” (PROA) that each 
automaker is assumed to choose between.  
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Automakers’ Goal: Maximum Feasible Pretax Variable Profit 
This study estimates the impact of specific change in gasoline prices and technological 
choices on automakers’ sales and pretax variable profits. It is reasonable to assume that 
manufacturers base their decisions about technologies to put in their vehicles on their 
expectations of the impacts of their decisions on their profits. The economic success of an 
enterprise is measured by its profit—the difference between the revenue it receives from 
customers for its products and the total costs of producing, selling, and distributing its 
products. For a specific change in product technologies or market conditions, the change in 
the enterprise’s success is measured by the resulting change in profits.  
 
We focus on the efficiency of various technologies and product decisions in generating 
incremental profits rather than on total profits, which are the cumulative result of prior 
actions and decisions. Due to the fact that we are interested in changes in profits resulting 
from new technologies and products, we ignore fixed costs. 
 
Variable profit-per-unit is defined as a vehicle’s wholesale price minus the cost of the 
materials, labor, and energy inputs used to produce the vehicle. Operationally, we used 
manufacturer- and segment-specific estimates of gross profit margins to compute variable 
profits. Variable profit is not affected by the substantial fixed costs associated with building 
and selling automobiles, such as the amortization of capital equipment (i.e., factories and 
tools); legacy costs (i.e., pension and medical costs for retirees); marketing costs; and 
research, development, and engineering costs. 
 
A manufacturer can have substantial variable profits from its automotive operations but still 
post total pretax losses if its fixed costs are greater than its variable profits. However, the 
change in total profit resulting from a change in units sold, is always equal to the change in 
variable profit. This is mathematically true by definition. 
 
Let Q be number of units sold, NP be net profit, VP be variable profit, P be wholesale price, 
VC be variable cost per unit, and FC be fixed cost. By definition, 
 
(1)
! 
VP =Q(P "VC) 
(2)
! 
NP =VP "FC . 
Therefore, 
(3) 
! 
NP =Q(P "VC)"FC  
 
The first term in equation (3) is a function of the number of units sold (Q). In addition to the 
direct relationship between net profit (NP) and units sold (Q), there are indirect impacts on 
profits of units sold because wholesale price (P) and variable cost per unit (VC) are 
themselves functions of Q. Price (P) is a decreasing function of units sold (Q) because to sell 
more units the company must lower the price, and variable cost (VC) is an increasing 
function of units sold because to increase production the company bids up the costs of 
materials, energy, and other inputs. Fixed costs (FC) by definition do not vary with the 
number of units sold (Q). The equivalence of changes in total profit and variable profit is 
demonstrated by the equality of the total differential of net profit (NP) and the total 
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differential of variable profit (VP). These differentials are equal, because the impact of units 
sold on fixed cost (
! 
dFC
dQ
) is zero by definition. 
 
(4) 
! 
dNP = P "VC( ) + dPdQ "
dVC
dQ( )[ ]dQ " dFCdQ = P "VC( ) + dPdQ " dVCdQ( )[ ]dQ  
(5) 
! 
dVP = P "VC( ) + dPdQ "
dVC
dQ( )[ ]dQ  
 
McManus et al. (2005) used variable profit estimates from calendar year 2001-04. We 
updated our estimates with 2005 data for this study. The table below shows our estimates of 
average retail transaction prices and variable profit margins by manufacturer and 
(separately) by segment.  
 
Automaker
Average 
Price
Variable 
Profit 
Margin
Segment
Average 
Price
Variable 
Profit 
Margin
BMW $43,245 25% CARLUX $41,230 24%
DaimlerChrysler $27,295 20% CARMID $22,200 19%
Ford $27,670 19% CARSML $17,170 18%
GM $26,570 17% CUVLUX $37,180 23%
Honda $25,890 22% CUVMID $27,100 20%
Hyundai $17,175 19% CUVSML $18,490 18%
Nissan $25,625 22% MINIVAN $25,770 20%
Porsche $74,030 30% PULRG $28,910 18%
Subaru $25,400 18% PUSML $20,630 18%
Suzuki $18,660 18% SUVLLX $56,380 25%
Toyota $26,285 22% SUVLRG $35,520 19%
VW $28,000 23% SUVMID $27,190 19%
All $26,740 20% SUVMLX $47,660 24%
SUVSML $21,190 17%
VANLRG $24,040 17%
All $26,740 20%
By Automaker By Segment
Average Price and Variable Profit Margin, 2010
 
Fuel Price Uncertainty  
A critical risk facing automakers is the future price of fuel. We developed our scenarios with 
two alternative future fuel prices. The starting point for our fuel price scenarios was the 
Annual Energy Outlook 2006 (AEO 2006) by the U.S. Energy Information Administration. 
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Price Scenario 
AEO 2006 
(2004$) 
AEO 2006 
(2005$) 
This Study 
High $2.46 $2.54 $3.10 
Base $2.11 $2.18 $2.30 
Low $1.99 $2.06 $2.00 
  
The AEO reports historical prices as well as forecast prices in 2004 dollars. We adjusted 
those figures for inflation in consumer prices from 2004 to 2005 (3.3%), and adjusted the 
AEO forecast in 2010 to be on a linear trend. The choice of 2010 as the focus is arbitrary, 
and the general trend is more important than the forecast in any specific year. We define a 
base case and two alternative scenarios for the price of a gallon of gasoline in 2010. 
 
The AEO high and low price cases are based on different assumptions about how much 
crude oil exists in proven reserves and on costs of extraction and refining. The AEO high 
price case assumes 15% lower reserves and higher costs than the base. The AEO low price 
case assumes 15% higher reserves and lower costs. For this study, the base line was 
calibrated to the average 2005 price, $2.30, and the range of uncertainty about reserves was 
doubled to 30% more or less than the base.  
Discount Rate Uncertainty 
In our scenario analysis, we incorporated uncertainty about the discount rate by computing 
results with two different discount rates: 0.0% implied by the hedonic analysis and 7.0% as a 
more conservative alternative. In defining automaker strategies, we used 3.5% (the average 
of 7% and 0%). 
Five Aggregate Automakers: Strategic Players 
Our interest is focused on the situation of the Detroit automakers, so we grouped the larger 
Japanese automakers together in the scenario analysis into a synthetic aggregate referred to 
as Japan 3 and all other automakers together into an aggregate referred to as “Others”. 
Limiting the number of strategic players also keeps the competitive analysis manageable 
without a significant loss of realism. The table below lists the market brands included in 
each of the five aggregates. 
DaimlerChrysler Ford Motor Co. GM Japan 3 Other
Chrysler Ford Buick Acura Audi
Dodge Jaguar Cadillac Honda BMW
Jeep Land Rover Chevrolet Infiniti Hyundai
Mercedes Lincoln GMC Nissan Kia
Mazda Hummer Lexus Mini
Mercury Pontiac Scion Mitsubishi
Volvo Saab Toyota Porsche
Saturn Subaru
Suzuki
Volkswagen
Strategic Aggregate Automakers Defined by Marketing Brands
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Fuel Economy Strategic Alternatives 
While there are, of course, many fuel economy strategies that automakers could pursue, we 
defined two strategies for the scenario analyses that characterize the range of possibilities: 
BAU and PROA. An automaker with a BAU strategy would make no fuel economy 
improvements beyond what is necessary to meet the 2010 CAFE standards. An automaker 
with a PROA strategy would make all fuel economy improvements that would result in a net 
improvement of the value of the automakers vehicles to consumers (using our consumer 
choice model to measure value). 
Decision-Making Under Uncertainty 
Without a clear national policy or a binding agreement among automakers to increase fuel 
economy performance, individual automakers are free to choose between fuel economy 
strategies in a highly competitive and risky environment. An automaker’s task would be 
greatly simplified if a number of key uncertainties were removed, such as future fuel prices, 
how much consumers value fuel economy, competitors’ strategies, and what national fuel 
economy standards will be in place.  Since it is not possible to predict the future with 
certainty, an automaker must somehow take account of the range of possible situations it 
will find itself facing, and make decisions today that optimize their outcome in light of the 
uncertain future. To characterize the decision environment the automakers face, we defined 
the alternative market demand for vehicles and fuel economy that could exist based on the 
extreme values of the price of fuel and the consumer discount rate, and then estimated the 
pretax variable profit of each automaker in all possible combinations of choices of BAU and 
PROA by all the competitors. For example, if the market demand were defined by a fuel 
price of $3.10/gallon and a 0% consumer discount rate, then one possible outcome would 
have Ford choosing PROA and all the other automakers choosing BAU. With five strategic 
players there are 25 = 32 combinations of choices of BAU or PROA by the automakers for 
each alternative market demand. In total, there are 128 possible market outcomes.  
 
Game theory is ideally suited to analyze the competitive behavior of automakers in this 
setting and can help researchers and policy-makers predict outcomes in complex market 
situations. (See Fudenberg and Tirole [1991], the definitive game theory reference 
textbook.) In this section, we describe a simplified strategic game facing the automakers. 
Since we are more interested in Detroit automakers than in others (both in the decisions they 
make and the impacts of competition on them), we define five strategic players: 
DaimlerChrysler, Ford, GM, Japan 3, and Other. Each strategic player aims to maximize its 
variable profit and is assumed to have only the two strategic fuel economy options we 
defined earlier: BAU or PROA. 
 
the “Maximin Rule” (Rawls [1971]) of game theory allows us to “solve” for each 
competitor’s optimal strategy. The maximin principle of game theory suggests a way for an 
automaker in this situation to decide. For each automaker, the choice of a fuel economy 
strategy divides the 128 total possible outcomes into two sets: 64 in which it follows BAU 
and 64 in which it follows PROA. 
 
Within each of these two sets of 64 there are outcomes in which the automaker makes higher 
profits and other outcomes in which the automaker makes lower profits, and the range of 
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profits in the two sets often overlap. There is a temptation to choose the strategy in which 
the best outcome is better than the best outcome for the other strategy. However, the 
automaker can choose only which set of 64 outcomes it receives, not which outcome among 
the 64 it ultimately gets. 
 
A better approach would be to choose the strategy in which the worst case is better than the 
worst case for the other strategy. By choosing the strategy with the best worst case, the 
automaker is certain to attain at least the profit associated with this case, no matter what its 
competitors choose to do, and no matter what the price of fuel and the consumer discount 
rate are. The maximin is the best worst case.  
 
As an example, the figure below illustrates the situation for Ford. Ford’s pretax variable 
profit in each of the 128 scenarios is shown. The 64 scenarios in which Ford follows BAU 
are marked by the filled circles, and the 64 scenarios in which Ford follows PROA are 
marked by the hollow triangles.  
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Results 
Raising Fuel Economy as a Key Strategy to Maximize Profits 
We find that the optimal strategy for all five competitors is the “Proactive” (PROA) fuel 
economy strategy. Even if fuel price were $2.00/gallon and consumer discount rate were 
7%, the strategy that maximizes each automaker’s variable profits is to pursue PROA fuel 
economy improvements. Applying the maximin principle, it turns out that all automakers 
should choose PROA and increase their fuel economy beyond what is required for CAFE in 
2010. 
 
In game theory, Nash equilibrium (Nash [1950]) is a stable market situation in which no 
automaker can gain by unilaterally changing its strategy if the strategies of the other 
automakers remain unchanged. The maximin solution in which all five automakers choose 
PROA is “Nash equilibrium,” meaning that no individual automaker would be better if it 
chose BAU, starting from all five at PROA. 
 
Conclusion: The PROA strategy is a better choice than BAU for each of the five 
automakers and, if all were to follow PROA, no automaker would have an incentive to 
differentiate itself by choosing BAU. 
 
This surprising conclusion is true if the price of fuel and the consumer discount rate are not 
known with certainty, but it is yet more surprisingly also true in each of the four market 
demand scenarios we evaluated. Regardless of which fuel price or consumer discount rate 
(among our alternatives) are actually operative, the maximin principle leads to the 
conclusion that the PROA strategy is the optimal strategy for each and every automaker. 
What this means is that an automaker that picks PROA today, without knowing what the 
price of fuel and consumer discount rate are going to be in 2010, would not regret or want to 
change this decision in 2010. 
 
This conclusion, of course, applies to the Japan 3. However, if all automakers were to 
choose the PROA strategy (which they should according to the maximin principle), then the 
Japan 3 automakers would actually have lower variable profits than they would in the base 
case. Even so, the optimal strategy for the Japanese manufacturers is to pursue fuel economy 
improvements, since they stand to lose even more profit if they do not improve their fuel 
economy but the Detroit automakers improve theirs. 
Detroit Automakers’ Profits are Highly Sensitive to Fuel Prices 
under Business- As-Usual Fuel Economy Scenarios  
To estimate change in variable profits under “Business as Usual” (BAU) fuel economy 
levels, we compare profits in four cases defined by the two alternative fuel prices 
($2.00/gallon and $3.10/gallon) and the two alternative consumer discount rates (0% and 
7%) to our base case. 
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Automaker Profit
Over/ 
(Under) 
Base
Profit
Over/ 
(Under) 
Base
Profit
Over/ 
(Under) 
Base
Profit
Over/ 
(Under) 
Base
DaimlerChrysler $16.7 $15.6 ($1.0) $15.8 ($0.9) $17.1 $0.4 $17.0 $0.3
Ford $18.8 $17.6 ($1.2) $17.8 ($1.0) $19.3 $0.5 $19.2 $0.4
GM $19.6 $18.2 ($1.4) $18.5 ($1.2) $20.2 $0.5 $20.1 $0.4
Japan 3 $29.8 $29.1 ($0.8) $29.0 ($0.8) $30.1 $0.3 $30.1 $0.3
Others $10.7 $10.3 ($0.3) $10.3 ($0.3) $10.8 $0.1 $10.8 $0.1
Total $95.6 $90.9 ($4.7) $91.4 ($4.3) $97.4 $1.8 $97.3 $1.6
Detroit 3 $55.1 $51.5 ($3.6) $52.1 ($3.1) $56.5 $1.4 $56.3 $1.2
Percent of Total 58% 57% 77% 57% 72% 58% 78% 58% 73%
Risk to Variable Profit ($Billions) of Business as Usual on Fuel Economy
Base 
(Fuel 
$2.30/gal)
Fuel $3.10/gal and 
Discount Rate 0%
Fuel $3.10/gal and 
Discount Rate 7%
Fuel $2.00/gal and 
Discount Rate 0%
Fuel $2.00/gal and 
Discount Rate 7%
 
 
As shown in the table above, Detroit automakers’ profits are much more sensitive to fuel 
prices than are the Japanese automakers’ profits. These results are consistent with the 
findings in McManus et al. (2005). Pursuing business as usual, Detroit loses $3.1 to $3.6 
billion in variable profits when fuel costs $3.10/gallon compared to $2.30/gallon, accounting 
for 72-77% of the total industry losses. In contrast, the Japan 3 also see a reduction in 
variable profits, but at a much lower level, $0.8 billion.  Conversely, if fuel prices drop to 
$2.00/gallon, Detroit automakers do better than the Japanese automakers if both were to 
continue business as usual. Detroit’s variable profits increase by $1.2 to $1.4 billion when 
fuel costs $2.00/gallon compared to $2.30/gallon. In contrast, the Japan 3 only gain a total of 
$0.3 billion.  
 
Detroit’s profits are much more sensitive to fuel prices than to consumer discount rates. The 
variable profits of the Japan 3 are much less sensitive to both fuel prices and consumer 
discount rates than Detroit’s are.  
 
The results are driven by the sensitivity of total industry segment mix to fuel prices 
combined with Detroit’s less fuel-efficient segment mix. Higher fuel prices decrease 
consumer demand for fuel-inefficient products, especially truck-based SUVs, and increase 
demand for more fuel-efficient vehicles, including crossovers, minivans, and cars. At lower 
fuel prices, the reverse is true. Detroit automakers sell a much larger fraction of less efficient 
truck-based vehicle products than other automakers do, so they bear the brunt of changes in 
fuel prices. 
Higher Fuel Economy Performance Benefits Detroit Automakers 
Next, we examine how automaker variable profits would change if all automakers 
aggressively pursue fuel economy improvements, either voluntarily or through a change in 
national policy. The table below shows the gains in variable profits if all automakers 
pursued a PROA instead of a BAU fuel economy strategy in the four market demand 
scenarios. 
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Automaker Base BAU PROA
PROA 
O/(U) 
BAU
BAU PROA
PROA 
O/(U) 
BAU
DaimlerChrysler $16.7 $15.6 $15.8 $0.1 $17.1 $17.1 $0.1
Ford $18.8 $17.6 $19.0 $1.4 $19.3 $20.1 $0.9
GM $19.6 $18.2 $18.7 $0.5 $20.2 $20.5 $0.3
Japan 3 $29.8 $29.1 $28.5 ($0.6) $30.1 $29.8 ($0.3)
Others $10.7 $10.3 $10.4 $0.0 $10.8 $10.8 $0.0
Total $95.6 $90.9 $92.3 $1.4 $97.4 $98.4 $0.9
Automaker Base BAU PROA
PROA 
O/(U) 
BAU
BAU PROA
PROA 
O/(U) 
BAU
DaimlerChrysler $16.7 $15.8 $15.9 $0.1 $17.0 $17.1 $0.1
Ford $18.8 $17.8 $18.7 $0.9 $19.2 $19.7 $0.5
GM $19.6 $18.5 $18.8 $0.3 $20.1 $20.3 $0.2
Japan 3 $29.8 $29.0 $28.7 ($0.2) $30.1 $30.1 ($0.1)
Others $10.7 $10.3 $10.4 $0.0 $10.8 $10.8 $0.0
Total $95.6 $91.4 $92.5 $1.2 $97.3 $98.0 $0.8
Fuel $3.10/gal Fuel $2.00/gal
Discount 
Rate         
0%
Discount 
Rate         
7%
Results: Automakers' Variable Profits ($Billions)
 
 
 
As shown in the table above, Detroit automakers benefit from raising the fuel economy of 
their vehicles in all four cases. That is, regardless of fuel prices or consumer discount rates, 
our results indicate that a PROA program to raise industry-wide fuel economy performance 
would increase the variable profits of Detroit automakers. While the gains are greatest in the 
case with high fuel prices and low consumer discount rates and smallest in the case with low 
fuel prices and high consumer discount rates, the gains are nevertheless positive in all cases. 
Ford stands to gain more in variable profit from a proactive program of industry-wide fuel 
economy improvements. GM’s gains are about one-third of Ford’s, and DaimlerChrysler’s 
gains are much smaller. 
 
The Japan 3 have very different results from those of Detroit. The Japan 3 actually face a 
small reduction in their variable profits if all automakers pursue PROA fuel economy 
strategies. One factor limiting the Japan 3 losses is that they are expected to continue 
increasing their market share over the next several years at the expense of the Detroit 
automakers. The Planning Edge forecast predicts the market share of Detroit automakers to 
fall to 61% by 2010 from 62% in 2005, and predicts the market share of the Japan 3 to 
increase from 28 to 29%. 
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The table below shows changes in market share if all automakers pursued PROA instead of 
BAU fuel economy strategy in the four combinations of fuel prices and consumer discount 
rates. 
 
Automaker Base BAU PROA
PROA 
O/(U) 
BAU
BAU PROA
PROA 
O/(U) 
BAU
DaimlerChrysler 17.2% 16.8% 17.0% 0.1% 17.3% 17.3% 0.0%
Ford 19.9% 19.5% 20.4% 0.9% 20.1% 20.5% 0.4%
GM 24.0% 23.5% 23.6% 0.1% 24.2% 24.2% 0.0%
Japan 3 28.8% 29.8% 28.8% -1.0% 28.4% 27.9% -0.5%
Others 10.2% 10.3% 10.3% -0.1% 10.1% 10.0% 0.0%
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 0.0% 100.0% 100.0% 0.0%
Automaker Base BAU PROA
PROA 
O/(U) 
BAU
BAU PROA
PROA 
O/(U) 
BAU
DaimlerChrysler 17.2% 17.0% 17.0% 0.0% 17.3% 17.2% 0.0%
Ford 19.9% 19.6% 20.1% 0.5% 20.0% 20.2% 0.1%
GM 24.0% 23.7% 23.7% 0.0% 24.1% 24.1% 0.0%
Japan 3 28.8% 29.4% 28.9% -0.5% 28.5% 28.4% -0.1%
Others 10.2% 10.3% 10.3% 0.0% 10.1% 10.1% 0.0%
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 0.0% 100.0% 100.0% 0.0%
Fuel $3.10/gal Fuel $2.00/gal
Discount 
Rate         
0%
Discount 
Rate         
7%
Results: Automakers' Market Shares
 
 
The information in the table above shows that if all automakers followed a BAU fuel 
economy strategy, then high fuel prices would cause additional losses of 0.8 to 1.2 points of 
market share by Detroit automakers and equivalent gains by the Japan 3. If all automakers 
followed a PROA fuel economy strategy, as we have defined it, then Detroit automakers 
would recover most of these losses at the expense of the Japan 3. Lower fuel prices would 
have relatively small impact on market shares. 
 
In the section of this report covering technology options, we identified the potential fuel 
economy improvements that the automakers could obtain by 2010 implementing only the 
improvements that consumers would value more than the cost. We estimated an overall 
improvement of 1.5 MPG assuming that the baseline sales of each vehicle would be 
unchanged. This assumption is appropriate to isolate the impact of technology 
improvements from the impact of customers moving to more fuel-efficient vehicles. The 
table below shows the full fuel economy changes that include both the technology and 
customer impacts. The full improvements are greater than the technology-driven 
improvements alone (The sole exception is Ford in Market Demand IV in which they are 
equal). The smallest improvement beyond the technology-driven 1.5 MPG would occur 
under Market Demand IV (fuel price $2.00; discount rate 7%). Consumer-shifting-driven 
improvements range from 0.08 to 0.13 MPG beyond the technology-driven improvements. 
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Automaker Base BAU PROA
PROA 
O/(U) 
BAU
BAU PROA
PROA 
O/(U) 
BAU
DaimlerChrysler 23.60 23.90 25.84 1.94 23.49 25.20 1.71
Ford 23.71 24.01 27.33 3.32 23.60 26.67 3.07
GM 23.58 23.97 25.66 1.69 23.44 24.99 1.55
Japan 3 27.00 27.58 28.40 0.82 26.79 27.60 0.81
Others 26.88 27.23 28.32 1.09 26.75 27.81 1.06
Total 24.82 25.26 27.04 1.78 24.66 26.33 1.67
Automaker Base BAU PROA
PROA 
O/(U) 
BAU
BAU PROA
PROA 
O/(U) 
BAU
DaimlerChrysler 23.60 23.80 25.53 1.73 23.52 25.10 1.58
Ford 23.71 23.91 27.00 3.09 23.63 26.56 2.92
GM 23.58 23.84 25.40 1.56 23.48 24.96 1.47
Japan 3 27.00 27.39 28.16 0.77 26.86 27.63 0.77
Others 26.88 27.11 28.12 1.01 26.79 27.79 0.99
Total 24.82 25.12 26.77 1.65 24.72 26.29 1.58
Fuel $3.10/gal Fuel $2.00/gal
Discount 
Rate         
0%
Discount 
Rate         
7%
Results: Automakers' Average Fuel Economy
 
 
What explains the advantages to Detroit automakers of an industry-wide adoption of a 
PROA fuel economy strategy? The key factor is opportunity—the Detroit automakers have 
lower fuel economy than the Japan 3 and thus have more room for improvement. In the 
technological options section of this report we identified more improvement opportunities 
(for both new and carry-over powertrains) for the Detroit automakers than for the Japan 3. 
We excluded improvements that were not valued by consumers, and potential improvements 
were more likely to be excluded for the Japan-based than for the Detroit automakers. The 
Japan 3 could, in principle, maintain their fuel economy advantage at its baseline level by 
applying more technologies to more vehicles, but they would do so at the cost of variable 
profits. It is important to note that, while the Detroit automakers could narrow their fuel 
economy disadvantage relative to the Japan 3 automakers through a PROA fuel economy 
strategy, the Japan 3 automakers would still have an advantage.  
Employment Effects 
We estimated the impact of fuel prices on U.S. employment using the well-known model 
developed and maintained by Regional Economic Models, Inc. (REMI).  The REMI model 
takes the latest national input-output coefficients, which show how much each industry buys 
from every other industry, and tunes them to particular geographies using trade-flow data 
  38     
generated from the US Census of Transportation.  REMI’s forecasting and policy analysis 
system integrates inter-industry transactions, long-run equilibrium features, and economic 
geography.  It includes substitution among factors of production in response to changes in 
relative factor costs; migration responses to changes in expected income; labor participation 
rate responses to changes in real wage and employment conditions; wage rate responses to 
labor market changes; consumer consumption responses to changes in real disposable 
income and commodity prices; and local, regional and market share responses to changes in 
regional production costs.1 We used the REMI model for three classes of finished vehicles: 
(1) those assembled in the United States by GM, Ford, and DaimlerChrysler, (2) those 
assembled in Canada or Mexico by the same three automakers, and (3) those assembled in 
North America by other automakers. Based on reasonable estimates of U.S. parts content by 
vehicle type, web treat the second and third of the three groups as equivalent to half the U.S. 
content, and hence jobs, of the first group. For more details on how this model was adopted 
for this work see McManus et al 2005. 
 
The table below summarizes the effects on U.S. employment throughout the economy 
(automotive, other manufacturing, service sector, and spin offs) in our four market 
demand scenarios with all automakers following BAU or all automakers following PROA. 
We show the changes in employment for the Detroit 3 (GM, Ford, and DaimlerChrysler) 
and the transplants (foreign-owned automakers with plants in North America). 
 
Business 
as Usual
Pro-Active
Pro-Active 
Gain/ 
(Loss)
Business 
as Usual
Pro-Active
Pro-Active 
Gain/ (Loss)
Detroit Three (42,698) (7,865) 34,834 (40,486) (25,914) 14,572
Transplants (1,886) (21,175) (19,288) (7,832) (17,625) (9,793)
Total (44,585) (29,040) 15,545 (48,318) (43,539) 4,779
Detroit Three 15,961 27,020 11,059 15,186 13,166 (2,020)
Transplants 590 (10,302) (10,891) 2,811 (2,177) (4,988)
Total 16,551 16,718 168 17,997 10,989 (7,008)
$2.00/gallon
Impact of Fuel Economy Strategy on U.S. Employment
Consumer Discount Rate 7%Consumer Discount Rate 0%
$3.10/gallon
 
 
An industry-wide PROA has favorable impacts on employment linked to the Detroit 3, 
except under Market Demand IV (fuel price $2.00/gallon; discount rate 7%), and 
unfavorable impacts on employment linked to the transplants (in all market demand 
scenarios). The Japan 3 are the bulk of the transplants. The industry-wide proactive strategy 
shifts market share and profits from the Japan 3 automakers to GM, Ford, and 
DaimlerChrysler. Employment follows the vehicle market shift, and losses in employment 
linked to the transplants partially offset gains in employment linked to Detroit. The net 
                                                
1 Founded in 1980 by University of Massachusetts economist George Treyz, Regional 
Economic Models, Inc. is widely used by regional studies scholars and by policymakers 
evaluating the employment and fiscal impacts of investment and disinvestment events (e.g., 
base closings). For more information about the REMI model, please see www.remi.com. 
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impact on employment is favorable, except under Market Demand IV (fuel price 
$2.00/gallon; discount rate 7%). 
 
Our results imply that investment credits for automakers and suppliers, in support of an 
industry-wide PROA fuel economy strategy, could strengthen the employment benefits of 
higher fuel economy. 
 
Summary, Policy Implications, and Directions for Further Research 
 
Detroit Automakers’ Profits are Highly Sensitive to Fuel Prices under 
Business- As-Usual Fuel Economy Scenarios  
 
 Detroit automakers’ profits are much more sensitive to fuel prices than the 
Japanese automakers. These results are consistent with the findings in McManus 
et al. [2005[. Detroit automakers lose $3.1 to $3.6 billion in variable profits when 
fuel costs $3.10/gallon compared to $2.30/gallon, accounting for 72 to 77 percent 
of the total industry losses. In contrast, the three biggest Japanese manufacturers 
(Toyota, Honda, and Nissan) also see a reduction in variable profits, but at a 
much lower level, $0.8 billion.   
 
 Conversely, if fuel prices drop to $2.00/gallon, Detroit automakers do better than 
the Japanese automakers. Detroit’s variable profits increase by  $1.2 to $1.4 
billion when fuel costs $2.00/gallon compared to $2.30/gal. In contrast, the three 
biggest Japanese manufacturers only gain a total of $0.3 billion. 
 
 The differences in Detroit’s profits between high and low consumer discount 
rates are small compared to the differences generated by fuel prices. The variable 
profits of the three largest Japan-based automakers (Toyota, Honda, and Nissan) 
are much less sensitive to both fuel prices and consumer discount rates than 
Detroit’s are.  
 
 These results are driven by two critical factors. First, if fuel prices increase to 
$3.10/gallon, overall sales decline by 3.5%. At $2.00/gallon, overall sales 
increase by 1.3%. Second, higher fuel prices decrease consumer demand for fuel 
inefficient products, especially truck-based SUVs, and increase demand for more 
fuel efficient options, including crossovers, minivans, and cars. At lower fuel 
prices, the reverse is true. Consequently, since Detroit automakers sell a much 
larger fraction of less efficient truck-based vehicle products, they are much more 
vulnerable to variable fuel prices than the Japan-based automakers are. 
 
Proactively Increasing Fuel Economy would Benefit Detroit Automakers  
 
The results of our simulations were surprising, even to us. In all four market-demand 
situations we evaluated (defined by fuel price and consumer rate of time discount), 
proactively increasing fuel economy would be the optimal strategy for all automakers, in 
that it would result in the highest variable profit that each automaker could be assured of 
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earning, no matter what price of fuel (between $2.00 and $3.10 per gallon), consumer rate of 
time discount (between 0% and 7%), or actions by its competitors were realized.  
 
What was especially surprising was that the Detroit automakers (General Motors, Ford, and 
DaimlerChrysler) have more to gain from pursuing the aggressive fuel economy 
improvement strategy than do the three largest Japan-based automakers (Toyota, Honda, and 
Nissan). This is because the Detroit automakers face more risk (are more vulnerable) if they 
pursue business as usual than the Japan automakers do. The Detroit automakers also have 
more opportunities for improvement, since Detroit automakers currently have lower average 
fuel economy than the Japan automakers do. 
 
 Detroit automakers would benefit from raising the fuel economy of their vehicles 
regardless of fuel prices and consumer discount rates. Our results show that a 
proactive, industry-wide program to increase fuel economy performance would 
increase the profits of Detroit automakers by $0.8 to $2.0 billion per year 
(depending on the market-demand situation). 
 
 While the gains are greatest in the case of high fuel prices with low consumer 
discount rate and smallest in the case with low fuel prices and high consumer 
discount rate, the gains are nevertheless positive in all four potential market-
demand situations we evaluated.  
 
 Ford stands to gain the most in annual profits, more than twice as much as GM or 
DCX, by proactively pursuing fuel economy performance. Ford’s gains are from 
$0.5 to $1.4 billion, depending on the market-demand situation. GM’s gains are 
from $0.2 to $0.5 billion, depending on the market-demand situation. DCX’s 
gains are $0.1 billion (There are differences in DCX’s gains between market-
demand situations, but not sufficient to register at this level). 
 
 On the other hand, the three largest Japan-based automakers show very different 
results from those of Detroit. The Japan-based manufacturers actually see a 
reduction in their profits of $0.1 to $0.6 billion. In large part this is due to the fact 
that the Japan-based automakers have more fuel-efficient fleets than the Detroit 
automakers have, and therefore have less room for improvement. Under a 
proactive fuel economy strategy, Detroit-based manufacturers narrow the gap in 
fuel economy performance between their fleets and the fleets of the three largest 
Japan-based automakers. 
 
These surprising results are driven by the following factors: 
 
 The higher fuel economy level of the fleet helps to insulate total industry sales 
from declining under the high fuel price scenarios. That is, the entire industry 
makes more profit under high fuel prices if fuel economy levels are higher, ($1.2 
to $1.4 billion). More surprising is our prediction that under low fuel prices, total 
industry profits are higher by $0.8 to $0.9 billion if all automakers following 
PROA. This is because at $2.00 per gallon, some of the fuel economy 
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technologies are still cost-effective. This assessment is consistent with recent 
National Research Council findings on fuel economy [NRC (2002)] 
 
 The key factor that explains the advantages to Detroit-based automakers of 
adoption of a proactive fuel economy strategy is opportunity—the Detroit-based 
automakers have lower fuel economy than the three largest Japan-based 
automakers and thus have more room for improvement. In the technological 
options section of this report we identified a larger set of improvement 
opportunities (for both new and carry-over powertrains) for the Detroit-based 
than for the three largest Japan-based automakers. (We excluded improvements 
that were not valued by consumers, and such technically possible but not valued 
improvements were more likely to be excluded for the Japan-based than for the 
Detroit-based automakers.) 
 
  The three largest Japan-based automakers could, in principle, maintain their fuel 
economy advantage by applying more technologies to more vehicles, but they 
would do so at the cost of profits. It is important to note that, while the Detroit 
automakers could narrow their fuel economy disadvantage relative to the Japan 3 
automakers through a proactive fuel economy strategy, the Japan 3 automakers 
would still have an advantage. 
 
 Our study concludes that the Detroit automakers would benefit from pursuing 
proactive fuel economy improvements above what CAFE requires. This does not 
imply that raising CAFE requirements would benefit the Detroit automakers. 
That question was not directly addressed in the study, and it is important to 
understand that when we speak of an industry-wide or market-wide proactive 
fuel economy improvement strategy, we do not mean a higher CAFE standard, 
we mean the situation in which all automakers have chosen the PROA strategy.  
  
Proactively Increasing Fuel Economy would Protect American Jobs 
We estimated the impact of strategic choices by automakers on U.S. employment using the 
well-known model developed and maintained by Regional Economic Models, Inc. (REMI).  
The REMI model takes the latest national input-output coefficients, which show how much 
each industry buys from every other industry, and tunes them to particular geographies using 
trade-flow data generated from the US Census of Transportation. 
 
• Under high fuel prices, a market-wide proactive fuel economy improvement 
strategy would create 15,000 to 35,000 new jobs (throughout the whole 
economy) due to increased production by Detroit automakers. Decreased 
production by foreign-owned transplants would offset 10,000 to 19,000 jobs, for 
a net increase of 5,000 to 16,000 new jobs. 
 
• Under low fuel prices, but with low consumer discount rates as well, the net gain 
in new jobs is smaller (168 net new jobs), as 11,000 new jobs due to increased 
production by Detroit automakers are nearly fully offset by reduced production 
by foreign-owned transplants. 
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• Only in the case with low fuel prices and high consumer discount rate would the 
market-wide proactive fuel economy increases result in job losses. 
Public Policy Implications 
In light of our conclusion that the optimal strategy for all automakers is aggressive fuel 
economy improvement, even with $2.00/gallon fuel, why has it taken a steadily rising fuel 
price for five years, billions in lost profit, and tens of thousands of job losses to stimulate 
action by the Detroit automakers? What are the barriers to implementing the optimal 
strategy? 
 
Deploying new technologies takes time and money to accomplish, and time and money are 
in short supply in Detroit. The cumulative effects of declining market share, rising fuel 
prices, and uncompetitive product development are forcing drastic and costly changes at 
Ford, GM, and DaimlerChrysler. For the first time in more than 20 years, their survival is in 
doubt. GM and Ford may have just enough cash for one cycle of product development to 
bring new versions of their full product lines to market. Items seen as important but 
secondary to new vehicle designs are not getting funded. 
 
Public policy actions that will be accepted by Detroit automakers in the current situation will 
be actions that enhance their ability to respond to changing market conditions. Our research 
shows that increased fuel economy has the potential to enhance their flexibility, but pressing 
concern about what are seen as bigger issues make achieving progress challenging. 
 
To adequately address public policy concerns about fuel economy in the current economic 
environment requires the active, direct involvement of industry, labor, government, and 
other organizations in the search for policies that are generally acceptable to all interested 
parties and, more importantly, that work. New policies are inevitable. If industry leaders do 
not become engaged with other stakeholders, it is very likely that the new policies will be 
more onerous. 
 
Improving the fuel economy of America’s light vehicle fleet would help reduce our 
dependence on oil (much of which is in the hands of unstable or hostile regimes) and 
contribute significantly to reducing emissions of pollutants and greenhouse gases. Our 
research indicates that improving the fuel economy of Detroit automakers’ fleets would also 
reduce the risks to profits and American jobs of volatility in fuel prices. Reducing fuel 
consumption has become a national priority for leaders from both political parties. An 
emerging consensus sees reducing fuel consumption as a means to enhance national 
security, increase the market flexibility of American workers and communities, and help 
address climate change. 
 
There are four areas that a formal coalition of stakeholders with a federal mandate to 
develop policies should address: improving fuel economy, enhancing regulatory rationality 
and certainty, supporting the development of advanced technologies, and building a 
domestic supply chain for advanced technology fuel-efficient vehicles. These need to be 
considered in conjunction with the key policy leverage points at which interventions can 
have significant effects: the decision by consumers to purchase a vehicle, the decision by 
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automakers of the range of vehicles with different attributes to produce, and the decision by 
suppliers of which technologies to develop and provide to the automakers. 
 
No one would question the importance of purchase price (capital cost) in consumers’ vehicle 
choices. Tax incentives to encourage consumers to purchase fuel-efficient vehicles are 
already part of our policy environment, as are tax incentives to purchase inefficient SUVs 
and trucks.  Most observers believe that an increase in the federal excise tax on motor fuels 
would not find sufficient support in Congress, yet the recent experience with higher fuel 
prices has demonstrated the power of raising operating costs to influence consumers’ vehicle 
choices and thereby improve aggregate fuel economy. 
 
However it is difficult for consumer-focused instruments alone (incentives and/or fuel taxes) 
to achieve dramatic improvements in fuel economy. Automakers cannot radically alter their 
product mix very rapidly, nor do all consumers switch from one type of vehicle to another 
overnight. We have seen significant evidence of the beginning of a move from SUVs to cars 
by consumers, and some automakers have acknowledged it, but the present composition of 
the fleet is not going to change radically in the near term. Encouraging the development of 
technologies that improve the fuel economy all vehicle segments across the entire market, 
are needed to produce significant improvements in fuel economy. 
 
Encouraging advanced technologies across the entire fleet of vehicles calls for instruments 
that increase the portfolio of fuel-saving technologies available, make the technologies now 
or soon to be in the portfolio more attractive to automakers, and/or enhance the ability of 
suppliers to develop and commercialize new technologies.  
Directions for Further Research 
We had a fairly short-run focus in this report (2010), and did not assess the impacts of 
technologies that are not already available or soon will be. In our on-going work we are 
examining a broader portfolio of technologies including hybrids, clean diesel, ethanol, bio-
fuels, and plug-in hybrids. We also plan to evaluate technologies that increase fuel-economy 
but do not involve new powertrain technologies (e.g., light-weighting). 
 
While the structure we adopted for the strategic game theory model enabled some important 
insights, we are developing a more detailed model that treats the fuel economy strategic 
choice as continuous, rather than as a discrete choice of either BAU or PROA. We plan also 
to disaggregate the Japan 3 and Other automakers. 
 
We also think that an examination of the process followed by automakers in forming 
judgments about the market, especially about consumer demand for technologies and 
attributes, would help explain why the Detroit automakers were slow to recognize the abrupt 
change in consumer demand we have seen recently, and help speed their reaction in the 
future. 
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Appendix: Potential for Near-Term Fuel Economy 
Improvements for the 2010 U.S. Passenger Vehicle Fleet2 
 
 
Methodology 
In this analysis, we assess the ability for manufacturer to incorporate new and existing 
technologies to improve the fuel economy performance of their overall fleet without 
changing their product portfolios. We start with a review of historical and forecasted rates of 
technological improvement in order to get a general sense for what improvement might be 
possible. We then describe our detailed approach based on engineering assessments and a 
detailed product plan forecast for calendar year 2010. This assessment differs from those in 
the past (e.g., DeCicco et al, 2001, NAS 2002) in that it uses a detailed product forecast for 
each manufacturer by vehicle model-engine-transmission for 2010 to estimate near-term 
fleetwide potential. 
 
By combining an engineering assessment of what fuel economy technologies are available 
with a detailed forecast of each manufacturer’s production plans including when individual 
models would have an opportunity to integrate new technology, we can develop a realistic 
sense for the technical potential to raise fuel economy levels. We also incorporate a decision 
making rule to determine what level of technology to apply based on the package’s 
incremental cost and a consumer test of willingness to pay. In this way, we ensure that the 
package makes financial sense for the manufacturer and consumer to apply. 
 
To assess the opportunity for technology improvement, we divide the vehicle fleet into two 
categories. The first category is those vehicles that are scheduled for a new engine or new 
platform starting in model years 2005 to 2010. These vehicles have modern engines that 
have the opportunity for substantial improvement. The second category is those vehicles that 
are not scheduled for new engines between now and 2010. While these engines have less 
opportunity for improvement, there are nonetheless incremental opportunities for 
improvement, through refinements of existing technology and by directing the technologies 
that are likely to be adopted toward fuel economy improvements (rather than increasing 
power). An example would be variable valve timing which manufacturers have been steadily 
incorporating into their existing engines, but primarily using the benefits to improve power 
rather than fuel economy performance. 
 
                                                
2 Written by Dr. Feng An, Energy and Transportation Technologies, LLCD; Roland J. 
Hwang, Natural Resources Defense Council; Dr. Walter McManus, Automotive Analysis 
Division, University of Michigan Transportation Research Institute; and Alan Baum, The 
Planning Edge. 
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Rate of Improvement Possible based on Historic and Forecasted Rates of 
Fuel Economy Improvement  
 
Historic Rates of Improvement 
Analysis by EPA, DOE and Oak Ridge National Laboratory shows that the historic rate of 
fuel economy increase since the late 1970s or early 1980s would have been from 1 to 3% if 
technologies had been used to increase the fuel economy performance of the fleet of to 
increase vehicle weight, size and performance (EPA 2005, DOE 1995, ORNL 1994).  
 
Table 1. Historic Rate of Efficiency Improvement if Technology Used for Fuel Economy 
Improvement 
Study Fuel 
economy 
potential 
(mpg) 
Increase 
from 
baseline 
(mpg) 
Period 
(years) 
Implied Rate 
of Increase (% 
per annum) 
EPA 2005. Light-Duty Automotive Technology and Fuel Economy Trends Report: 1975-2005 
Cars: If 1981 weight & 0-60 36.4 11.3 24 1.6% 
Cars: If 1981 size & 0-60 37.1 12.0 24 1.6% 
Light Trucks: If 1981 weight & 0-60 28.5 8.4 24 1.5% 
Light Trucks: If 1981 size & 0-60 25.0 4.9 24 0.9% 
DOE 1995.  Energy Conservation Trends: Understanding the Factors that Affect Conservation Gains in 
the U.S. Economy 
Cars and Light Trucks: 1975 to 1993   18 2.2% 
Oak Ridge National Laboratory, 1994. Transportation Energy Efficiency Trends, 1972-1992 
Cars: 1975-93 if const weight and power 26.4 10.6 18 2.9% 
 
Forecasted Rates of Improvement through Adoption of New Technologies 
A number of recent studies have demonstrated that there is substantial technical opportunity 
to improve the fuel economy of today’s fleet. A review of recent study suggests that a 
roughly 4% annual rate of improvement is consistent with engineering/economic forecasts 
of what is technically achievable and cost-effective (see Table 1). Based on the technology 
forecasts from National Research Council, a 2.9 to 4.4% annual increase is possible for the 
U.S. passenger vehicle fleet without changing weight, size mix, or decreasing performance 
of today’s fleet (NRC 2001). Analysis performed for DOE and DOT, shows that the 
technical potential for light trucks by 2010 (prior to recent CAFE light truck rulemaking) is 
4.1% per year (EEA 2005). Analysis by ACEEE, suggests that a higher rate, 4 to 5.8%, is 
possible without changing size mix or performance, but using a number of engine and 
powertrain technologies as well as substituting lightweight, high-strength materials to reduce 
weight (ACEEE 2001). 
 
Rate of Improvements Using Adoption of Existing and Planned Technologies 
A moderate rate of fuel economy increase of 2% annually is seen by limiting the technology 
to today’s “best-in-class” technology (not including hybrids) and assuming a conservative 
10-year adoption demonstrates (EPA 2005). The analysis by EEA 2005 also showed that the 
light truck fleet could be improved by 2.8% per year just using planned technologies (EEA 
2005). The very modest NHSTA MY2004 to MY2011 light truck fuel economy standards 
requires just a 2% annual increase. With no new increase in fuel economy standards, the 
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Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT 2000) estimates that an annual rate of 
improvement (based on a midsize car) of 2.2% would occur if new technologies that will be 
entering the fleet are used to improve fuel economy. 
 
Table 2. Forecasted Rates of Fuel Economy Improvement 
Study Fuel 
economy 
potential 
(mpg) 
Increase 
from 
baseline 
(mpg) 
Period 
(years) 
Implied Rate 
of Increase 
(% per 
annum) 
Using Existing and New Technologies 
        
National Academy of Science 2002. Effectiveness and Impact of Corporate Average Fuel Economy 
(CAFE) Standards 
Path 2, <10 years 33.0 9.0 10 3.2% 
Path 3, 10-15 years 37.0 13.0 10 4.4% 
Path 3, 10-15 years 37.0 13.0 15 2.9% 
Energy and Environmental Analysis, 2005. Fuel Economy Potential for 2010 Light Duty Trucks, report 
prepared for DOE and DOT 
Planned and new technologies 26.2 4.7 5 4.1% 
Only planned technologies 24.7 3.2 5 2.8% 
American Council for an Energy Efficient Economy, 2001. Technical Options for Improving the Fuel 
Economy of U.S. Cars and Light Trucks by 2010-2015 
Moderate package 36.0 12.0 9 4.6% 
Advanced package, 10-15 years 42.0 18.0 10 5.8% 
Advanced package, 10-15 years 43.0 19.0 15 4.0% 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2001. On the Road in 2020 
"Evolved" midsize car, no new standards 43.2 15.4 20 2.2% 
EPA 2005 "Best In Class" (assuming 10 year phase-in.) Light-Duty Automotive Technology and Fuel 
Economy Trends Report: 1975-2005 
Cars: Best 4 nameplates in size class 36.3 7.4 10 2.3% 
Cars: Best 12 vehicles in size class 35.4 6.5 10 2.0% 
LTs: Best 4 nameplates in size class 24.9 3.6 10 1.6% 
LTs: Best 12 vehicles in size class 25.7 4.4 10 1.9% 
Both: Best 4 nameplates in size class 29.5 5.0 10 1.9% 
Both: Best 12 vehicles in size class 29.8 5.3 10 2.0% 
 Existing NHSTA Light Truck Fuel Efficiency Improvements Requirements, MY04-11 
NHSTA CAFE Light Truck Rule Makings 24.1 3.4 8 1.9% 
 
Ongoing adoption of new technologies alone shows that about a 2% rate of improvement is 
possible if those technologies are used to improve fuel economy rather than increase size, 
weight and power of the fleet. 
 
Conclusion: 2% to 4% Annual Rate of Improvement is Possible 
Based on this review, we reach the conclusion that automakers could achieve an annual 
increase of roughly 2% fleetwide by using already planned technologies, and achieve 
another roughly 2% improvement by accelerating adoption of planned and adding new 
incremental technologies. Examples of incremental planned technologies that are entering 
the fleet already and automakers will increasingly adopt over next decade include: cylinder 
deactivation, variable valve lift and timing, improved alternators, 5 and 6-speed 
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transmissions, continuously variable, transmissions, lower viscosity oil, improved 
aerodynamics, low rolling resistance tires. Example of emerging technologies whose 
adoption could be accelerated: gasoline direct injection engines, engine downsizing with 
turbochargers, integrated starter generators (idle off), automated manual transmissions 
(efficiency of manual, convenience of automatic), camless valve actuation (faster response, 
reduce friction losses from rollers and cams), mild and full hybrid systems, clean diesel 
engines. 
 
A 4% annual increase, assuming a 3-year lead time to start the improvements in model year 
2009, would imply a 2010 potential for increase of 8.2%.  If using just planned technologies 
and assuming a 1% to 2% annual increase starting in 2007, yields a similar 4% to 8.2% total 
increase by 2010. These estimates are roughly consistent with Honda’s recently announced 
voluntary goal to improve their fleetwide fuel economy by 5% between 2006 and 2010. 
  
Rate of Improvement based on Engineering Estimates and 2010 Product 
Forecast 
 
Technology Packages for New Engines and Vehicle Models 
We evaluated two packages of fuel-saving technologies based on the National Academy of 
Science’s recent fuel economy study (NAS 2002). The two packages are the  “Cost-efficient, 
14-year”, “Path 2.”  All of the Path 2 technologies currently exist, but not across the entire 
fleet. The “Cost-efficient, 14-year” package includes Path 1 (technologies which are likely 
to be adopted) and a subset of Path 2 technologies, those that the NAS study defines as 
“cost-efficient’ or pays for itself over 14 years (at $1.50/gallon and 12% discount rate) on 
the margin.  
 
Table 3. NAS Path 2 Technology Package  
Engine technologies 
 Engine Friction Reduction 
 Low Friction Lubricants 
 Multivalve, overhead camshaft (SUVs, Minivans, and Pickups only) 
 Variable valve lift and timing 
 Cylinder deactivation (Large car, SUVs, Minivan, and Pickups only) 
 Engine accessory improvements 
 Intake valve throttling 
Transmission technologies 
 Continuously variable transmission (Small SUV, Compact and Subcompact Car only) 
 Five or six-speed automatic transmission (Midsize and Large only) 
 
Automatic transmission/manual transmission (AST/ASM) (Midsize and Large Car, Mid SUV, 
Miniivan, Small Pickup only) 
Vehicle technologies 
 Aero drag reduction 
 Improved rolling resistance 
 42-V electrical systems 
 Integrated starter/generator (idle off-restart) (not on cars) 
  Electric power steering (Midsize and Large Car only) 
Source: NAS 2002. 
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We assume that for any eligible vehicle model that it can be improved to the fuel economy 
level estimated by NAS for that class segment. Since the NAS panel did not model 
crossovers, we compared existing crossovers to the cars that they are based on and found 
fuel economy at 75% to 90% of the car’s fuel economy (e.g, Honda CRV versus Honda 
Civic.) Therefore to be conservative, we reduce the fuel economy by 20% for the crossovers 
compared to the car platform segment it is based on. For example for a Honda CRV, we 
estimate the Path 2 fuel economy potential to be 80% of the 36.6 mpg for the compact car 
segment. 
 
The retail cost increase for the fuel efficiency packages that we use are also those estimated 
by NAS. We chose to not adjust the cost to reflect inflation, since the estimates are still 
within the range of costs that NAS provided. Furthermore, a recent EPA report supports 
using a much lower 1.26 retail markup factor, rather than the 1.40 used by NAS, a 10 
percent difference (Alson 2005). 
 
Table 4. NAS Fuel Economy Potential NAS  
Vehicle Class Fuel Economy (mpg) Cost 
    base 
Cost-
efficient Path 2 
Cost-
efficient Path 2 
Cars      
 Subcompact 31.3 35.1 37.5 $502  $1,018  
 Compact 30.1 34.3 36.6 $561  $1,088  
 Midsize 27.1 32.6 36.0 $791  $1,642  
 Large 24.8 31.4 34.5 $985  $2,167  
Light Trucks      
 Small SUV 24.1 30.0 31.4 $959  $1,543  
 Mid SUV 21.0 28.0 30.8 $1,254  $2,227  
 Large SUV 17.2 24.5 24.7 $1,629  $2,087  
 Minivans 23.0 29.7 34.0 $1,079  $2,227  
 Small Pickup 23.2 29.9 34.0 $1,067  $2,227  
  Large Pickup 18.5 25.5 28.2 $1,450  $2,542  
Source: NAS 2002  
 
By 2010, only a portion of the fleet would be eligible for these technology upgrades.   Life 
cycles of cars and trucks last three to five years, and life cycles of engines last eight to 
twelve years or longer. There is only enough time by 2010 to redesign the models that have 
relatively new engines with modern technologies. We choose to consider as eligible for the 
NAS packages vehicles with engines that were introduce in model year 2005 or later. These 
engines are modern, overhead cam, multivalve engines that have the ability to accommodate 
variable valve lift and timing technology. 
 
For those vehicles eligible for these technology packages, we apply the package only if the 
value to consumers exceeds the increase in price. This ensures that the manufacturers will be 
able to recover their investment cost. We apply the more aggressive of the two packages that 
meets this test. The test that we apply is whether the technology pays for itself over a 14-
year vehicle life (NAS), assuming $2.60 per gallon, and a 3.5% discount rate. 
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Improvement Possible Through Planned Improvements 
For carry-over engines not scheduled for replacement between 2005 and 2010, the “cost-
efficient” and Path 2 packages are not available. Instead, we applied improvements that rely 
on planned technologies to increase specific power (horsepower per liter) and apply them to 
enhancing fuel economy. The tradeoff is at the expense of increasing the specific power 
(horsepower per liter) of the engine. As noted above, EEA states that just using planned 
technologies the light truck fleet could be improve by 2.8% per year (EEA 2005). Honda has 
announced a 5% improvement (although this is probably a combination of new engines and 
improvements to existing engines.) 
 
A study by NESCCAF estimated what is equivalent to a 2.8% to 10.4% increase in fuel 
economy from 2002 to 2009 using planned technologies and holding performance constant 
(NESCCAF 2004). This equates to a 0.39% to 1.43% annual increase in fuel economy. For 
this study, we take the same rate of improvement and apply it to four model years (2007 to 
2010), which yields annual increases of 1.6% to 5.8%, depending on vehicle class. This is 
consistent with the above estimate based on a historical review of trends. 
 
Table 5. Carryover Engine Fuel Economy Improvements  
Vehicle Class 
Fuel Economy 
improvement, 
MY02-09 
Per annum, 
MY02-09 
Assumption this Study, 
MY06-09 
Small car 2.8% 0.39% 1.6% 
Large car 7.4% 1.03% 4.2% 
Minivan 7.2% 1.00% 4.1% 
Small Truck 10.4% 1.43% 5.8% 
Large Truck 6.0% 0.84% 3.4% 
Source: NESCCAF 2004. 
 
Product Forecast for 2010 
The Planning Edge provided forecasted U.S. sales for 2010 calendar year derived from its 
ongoing forecast of U.S. sales and North American production for light duty vehicles less 
than 8,500 lbs GVWR Information is provided at a variety of levels (e.g., unit sales by 
vehicle-engine-transmission-drive type combinations). The Planning Edge incorporates 
current and future production plans of automakers into the forecast, combining information 
from a variety of public and proprietary sources established over 15 years of experience 
producing forecasts for industry stakeholders. The Planning Edge forecast goes beyond 
automakers’ public announcements to incorporate additional vehicles and powertrains that 
are expected be in place by 2010 based on the sources mentioned above. 
 
The baseline distribution of sales across engine-transmission-drive types for a particular 
vehicle is based on the current distribution in production, and incorporates changes in 
marketing and manufacturing plans between now and 2010 (e.g., additional Escape hybrids 
to displace V6-powered Escapes as more parts become available and the cost premium for 
hybrids declines). The baseline assumes a long term fuel price of $2.30 per gallon and that 
automakers’ current fuel economy strategies are unchanged over the forecast period. 
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To develop the BAU fuel economy forecast, The Planning Edge incorporates EPA data from 
2005 and 2006 model years for combined city-highway fuel economy and other attributes 
for each of the vehicle-engine-transmission-drive types currently in the market that we 
expect to continue to be sold in 2010.  For new vehicle-engine-transmission-drive type 
configurations expected to be introduced between now and 2010, we estimated fuel 
economy and other attributes based on relevant attributes of similar vehicle, engine, 
transmission, and drivetrain combinations.  
 
We then compared the light truck forecast to the recent light truck CAFE rule adopted by 
NHSTA. For most manufacturers, our forecast matched well. For one/two [Ford others], the 
forecast was significantly lower then the NHSTA standard. In this/these case(s), we first 
assumed that the manufacturer would maximize the use of its flex fuel vehicle credits 
(equivalent to 1.2 mpg). If a gap still remained, we adjusted the fuel economy of the light 
truck models upwards by the same percentage.  
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Glossary 
Term Definition 
actual 
transaction 
prices 
Prices consumers pay for vehicles net of incentives 
AEO Annual Energy Outlook published by U.S. Energy Information Administration 
attributes Characteristics of vehicles that consumers value, such as performance, size, and fuel economy 
automakers Corporations that produce new light vehicles (cars and light trucks) 
AFE Average fuel economy (sales-weighted harmonic mean) 
BAU Identifier for the "business as usual" fuel economy strategy: making only those improvements necessary to meet CAFE 
Car A passenger automobile; any 4-wheel vehicle not designed for off-road use that is manufactured primarily for use in transporting 10 people or less. (Legal definition) 
CARLUX Luxury car segment (one of 15 segments) 
CARMID Midsize car segment (one of 15 segments) 
CARSML Small car segment (one of 15 segments) 
consumer 
value of fuel 
economy 
The average market value of one additional mile per gallon; the present value of the 
fuel costs saved because of differences in fuel economy for otherwise identical 
vehicles 
CAFE 
Corporate Average Fuel Economy; the sales-weighted average (harmonic mean) 
fuel economy, expressed in miles per gallon (mpg), of a manufacturer’s fleet of 
passenger cars or light trucks with a gross vehicle weight rating (GVWR) of 8,500 
lbs. or less, manufactured for sale in the United States, for any given model year 
CUV Crossover Utility Vehicle 
CUVLUX Luxury Crossover Utility Vehicle (one of 15 segments) 
CUVMID Crossover Utility Vehicle-Mid sized (one of 15 segments) 
CUVSML Crossover Utility Vehicle-small sized (one of 15 segments) 
Detroit 
automakers GM, Ford, and DaimlerChrysler 
discount rate The rate at which consumers discount future costs or savings in monetary terms  
discounted 
present value The value, in today's dollars, of a stream of payments (or savings) in the future 
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Term Definition 
Elasticity 
The percentage change in one variable with respect to a one percent change in 
another variable; an elasticity of -1.5 for y with respect to x means that a one 
percent increase in x induces a 1.5 percent reduction in y 
fuel economy The average mileage traveled by a vehicle per gallon of gasoline (or equivalent amount of other fuel) consumed; miles per gallon or MPG 
fuel economy 
improvements Increases in miles per gallon (MPG) 
fuel economy 
performance Synonymous with fuel economy; can refer to automaker's fleet 
fuel economy 
standards 
The “Energy Policy Conservation Act,” enacted into law by Congress in 1975, 
added Title V, “Improving Automotive Efficiency,” to the Motor Vehicle Information 
and Cost Savings Act and established CAFE standards for passenger cars and light 
trucks.  
fuel economy 
strategy Used in this study to refer to the choice by automakers of either BAU or PROA 
fuel price The price in dollars (or cents) per gallon of fuel 
fuel price 
scenarios 
Used to examine the impacts that a change in fuel price will have on demand for 
vehicles; this study used $2.30/gallon as the base, $2.00/gallon and $3.10/gallon as 
low and high alternatives 
game theory 
The branch of mathematics concerned with the analysis of strategies for dealing 
with competitive situations where the outcome of a participant's choice of action 
depends critically on the actions of other participants. 
GVWR 
Gross Vehicle Weight Rating; estimated total weight of a road vehicle that is loaded 
to capacity, including the weight of the vehicle itself plus fuel, passengers, cargo, 
and other miscellaneous items such as extra aftermarket parts. 
hedonic 
regression 
Hedonic regression, or more generally hedonic demand theory, in economics is a 
method of estimating demand or prices. It decomposes the item being researched 
into its constituent characteristics, and obtains estimates of the value of each 
characteristic. In essence it assumes that there is a separate market for each 
characteristic. It may be estimated using ordinary least squares (OLS) regression 
analysis. 
industry sales Retail deliveries of all types of light vehicles 
Light-duty 
truck Truck with GVWR of 10,000 lb or less. 
market share An automaker’s (or brand’s or model’s) percentage share of sales in a market 
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Term Definition 
maximin The maximin principle or maximin criterion states that the goal of a strategic choice should be to maximize the worst outcome that is, maximize the minimum. 
MINIVAN Minivan segment (one of 15 segments) 
MPG Miles per gallon; fuel economy 
MSRP Manufactures suggested retail price 
Nash 
equilibrium 
In game theory, the Nash equilibrium is a kind of optimal collective strategy in a 
game involving two or more players, where no player has anything to gain by 
changing only his or her own strategy. If each player has chosen a strategy and no 
player can benefit by changing his or her strategy while the other players keep 
theirs unchanged, then the current set of strategy choices and the corresponding 
payoffs constitute a Nash equilibrium. 
NMNL Nested MultiNomial Logit regression model; an econometric model of consumers’ choice among discrete alternatives, such as vehicle models 
powertrain Used to refer to the engine and transmission of a vehicle 
pretax 
variable profit See variable profits - before taxes are assessed 
price elasticity The percentage change in quantity demanded with respect to a one percent change in price.  
PROA Identifier for the "proactive" fuel economy strategy: making all feasible and profitable improvements above what is necessary to meet CAFE 
proactive fuel 
economy 
strategy  
PROA 
probability 
weighted 
forecasts 
Calculating the future value of a variable using weighted averages of different 
scenarios. 
PU Pickup truck segment; defined by models included 
PULRG Large pickup truck segment (one of 15 segments) 
PUSML Small pickup truck segment (one of 15 segments) 
REMI Regional Economic Models, Inc.; also refers to the model used to estimate the impact of production changes on U.S. employment 
retail 
transaction 
prices 
Prices consumers pay for vehicles net of incentives 
  54     
Term Definition 
segment A set of vehicle models that directly compete with each other. In this study we split the light vehicle market into 15 segments 
segment 
elasticity 
The percentage change in quantity demanded for a segment with respect to a one 
percent change in price for the segment.  
sub model Underlying model built within the nested multinomial logit regression model  
SUV 
Sport Utility Vehicle is a type of passenger vehicle which combines the load-hauling 
and versatility of a pickup truck with the passenger-carrying space of a van or 
station wagon. Most SUVs are designed with a roughly square cross-section, an 
engine compartment, a combined passenger and cargo compartment, and no 
dedicated trunk. 
SUVLLX Large Luxury SUV (one of 15 segments) 
SUVLRG Large SUV (one of 15 segments) 
SUVMID Midsize SUV (one of 15 segments) 
SUVMLX Midsize Luxury SUV (one of 15 segments) 
SUVSML Small SUV (one of 15 segments) 
total industry 
sales Includes all vehicles sold in a certain time period 
Truck 
A 4-wheel vehicle which is designed for off-road operation (has 4-wheel drive or is 
more than 6,000 lbs. GVWR and has physical features consistent with those of a 
truck); or which is designed to perform at least one of the following functions: (1) 
transport more than 10 people; (2) provide temporary living quarters; (3) transport 
property in an open bed; (4) permit greater cargo-carrying capacity than passenger-
carrying volume; or (5) can be converted to an open bed vehicle by removal of rear 
seats to form a flat continuous floor with the use of simple tools. (Legal definition) 
truck-based Chassis is built on a pickup truck platform 
type An aggregate of one or more segments. This study splits the light vehicle market into six types (CAR, CUV, MINIVAN, PU, SUV, VN). 
Uni-body Unibody vehicles are made of high-strength steel, welded into a single unit frame. 
utility In economics, utility is a measure of the happiness or satisfaction gained from a good or service 
Van It is generally a rather box-shaped vehicle on four wheels, about the same width and length as a large automobile, but taller and usually higher off the ground 
VANLRG Large Van (one of 15 segments) 
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Term Definition 
variable 
profits 
Variable profit per unit is defined as a vehicle’s wholesale price minus the cost of 
the materials, labor, and energy inputs used to produce the vehicle. Operationally 
we use gross profits as a proxy for variable profits. Variable profit is not affected by 
the substantial fixed costs associated with building and selling automobiles, such as 
the amortization of capital equipment (i.e., factories and tools); legacy costs (i.e., 
pension and medical costs for retirees); marketing costs; and research, 
development, and engineering costs. 
vehicles Used to refer to cars and trucks collectively 
VN Identical to VANLRG; Large Van 
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